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Tournament of Managers: Lessons from the Academic
Leadership Market
Usha R. Rodrigues*
Why do firms usually make, not buy, their chief executive officers (CEOs)? Public
corporationshire their CEOsfrom within the firm 78% of the time. They do so although
earlierstudies havefound no clearevidence that internalhires perform better than external
ones. So why do firms prefer them? Few scholars havefocused on this simple question.
The reason why firms favor internalcandidates matters not only in its own right, but
also for an overlooked reason: it informs the controversial question of executive
compensation. Currently board-compensationcommittees look to peer benchmarks to set
executive pay. But, taking cuesfrom comparablecompaniespresumes a robust managerial
market, one where firms must pay their CEOs "market price" or risk poaching. Iffirms
predominantly hire from within, it is far from clear why benchmarking, with its
concomitant upward pressure on executive pay across the board, is appropriate.
Why firms hire internal candidates thus provides a theoretical basisfor determining
appropriatepay. For example, if candidates'superior knowledge of the institution (firmspecific capital) drives the internalpreference, then firms can pay less than a "market"
rate because no true marketfor managers exists: a CEO's value is tied up with a particular
firm, and he cannot credibly threaten to leave. Similarly, iffirms promotefrom within to
inspire competition in lower ranks (tournament theory), then compensation should reflect
the price needed to incentivize lower ranks to compete to become CEO. In contrast, if the
board'sbetter information on internalcandidates(informationalasymmetry) explains the
preference, then a true market may existfor externalsable to demonstrate theirsuperiority.
Which of these theories is motivating boards to favor internal candidates?
To answer this question, this Article considers leadershipin an area where the firmspecific capital and information asymmetry explanations apply, but a tournament is
absent: academia. Analysis of a sample of top university presidentsreveals a bias in favor
of external, rather than internal, candidates. This finding suggests that the tournament
theory motivates publicfirms and has important implicationsfor executive compensation
policy.
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1. INTRODUCTION

In Brehm v. Eisner, a defining corporate law case, critics viewed the Disney board's
decision to hire Michael Ovitz, and then fire him fourteen months later with a $140 million
severance package, as the epitome of the problem of excess executive compensation:
compliant, complacent boards who were overly generous with shareholder money.2
Despite the many law review articles focused on the Disney case, and the countless
others that cite it, one important lesson remains overlooked by the legal literature.
Corporate law scholars, like the Delaware courts, focused on the board's faulty process in
negotiations to hire and fire Ovitz. 3 And, catalyzed by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's
1.

Brehm v. Eisner, 764 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).

2. See, e.g., Daniel J. Morrissey, The Path of CorporateLaw: Of Options Backdating, Derivative Suits,
and the Business Judgment Rule, 86 OR. L. REV. 973, 1012 (2007) (comparing the Disney case to that of Smith
v. Van Gorkom and questioning whether the Delaware Supreme Court was no longer up to calling "a complacent
board to account").
3. See, e.g., Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in CorporateDirectors: The

Disney Standardand the "New" Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211 (2006) (looking at the duty of good faith in
the context of Disney); Marc I. Steinberg & Matthew D. Bivona, Disney Goes Goofr: Agency, Delegation, and

CorporateGovernance, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (2008) (discussing the potentially diminished role of independent
directors in corporate governance after Disney).
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Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, they have
discussed the topic of executive compensation at great length. 4
However, legal scholars start with the firing, all but ignoring the first step in the
process: the hiring of Michael Ovitz as the next chief executive of Disney.5 The
responsibility of a public company board is to manage in situations where internal
management faces a conflict of interest, and chief among these is the selection, monitoring,
and firing of the CEO. 6 Yet, the board's choice of Ovitz-an industry outsider-received
relatively little attention.
Hiring Ovitz, an external candidate, was an anomaly. For-profit corporations
generally favor internal candidates, hiring externally only about 22% of the time. 7 The
literature is divided as to why boards would favor internal candidates over external ones,
but the answer to this question is of paramount importance for evaluating arguments about
compensation. Optimal contracting scholars point to the market for managerial talent as a
major justification for large pay packages. 9 "If we don't pay our CEO the market rate, we
will lose her," or so the argument goes. The compensation committees of public firms
typically engage compensation consultants who "benchmark" pay by reporting the pay
packages of the chief executives of comparable companies. 10 Critics of benchmarking cite
its inexorable tendency to ratchet up pay: if all boards regularly aim for their CEO to exceed
the median pay level, pay inevitably rises.
But the numbers make clear a more
fundamental issue: most CEOs come from inside an organization.12 This simple fact casts
doubt on the existence of a market for managerial talent. And, if there is no market for
CEOs, then perhaps firms can safely pay them significantly less.
A potential objection is that benchmarking is what prevents more of a market for
CEOs: by this logic, firms who break with industry practice and pay their CEOs less than
market rate risk poaching by other firms.13 Thus, the question this Article seeks to answer:
4. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SEC's Efforts to Regulate
Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481 (2007) (discussing Bebchuk and Fried's writing on executive

compensation along with the Disney case).
5.

See, e.g., Lawrence Lederman, Disney Examined: A Case Study in Corporate Governance and CEO

Succession, 52 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 557 (2007-2008) (questioning the process by which the former CEO brought
Ovitz on board and the succession plan, but only through the lens of the board of directors' fiduciary duties).
6. Report of the Task Force of the ABA Section of Business Law Corporate Governance Committee on

Delineation of GovernanceRoles and Responsibilities,65 BuS. LAW. 107, 123 (2009) (listing those functions as
central to the board's focus).
7. DeAnne Aguirre et al., From the Outside In, STRATEGY & BuS. (May 2, 2016), http://www.strategy-

business.com/feature/From-the-Outside-In?gko=24 9fb ("In the latest four-year period (2012-15), boards chose
outsiders
8.
9.
10.

in 22 percent of planned turnovers .... ).
See infra Part III (describing potential reasons for preferring inside candidates).
See infra Part II (describing executive pay levels).
See Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups, and Overcompensation:

Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 J. CORP. L. 487, 494-95 (2013) (discussing the process boards typically use when
benchmarking).
11. Id. at 498;

see

also Executive

Pay: Fat Cats Feeding,

ECONOMIST

(Oct.

9,

2003),

http://www.economist.com/node/2119378 ("Warren Buffett said recently, '[it would be a travesty if the bloated
pay of recent years became a baseline for future compensation. Compensation committees should go back to the
drawing board."').
12. Aguirre et al., supra note 7.
13. See Elson & Ferrere, supra note 10, at 504 ("Failure to respond to the external market environment
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why do publicly traded firms favor internal CEOs, and what effect does that reason have
on determining the appropriate level of executive compensation?
One potential explanation for favoring internal CEOs is that they perform better.
Unlike legal scholars, other literatures focus a great deal of attention on the question of
CEO selection.14 In particular, the focus is on the eternal "make or buy" question: should
companies promote internal candidates, or instead hire a replacement from outside the
firm? The literature on the topic is vast and not limited in scope to the CEOs of public
companies-or, indeed, traditional business settings. There are also studies of internal
versus external NCAA basketball coaches and professional baseball managers, among
other leadership contexts. 15 Yet, despite the myriad studies, results remain inconclusivethey do not reliably show that internal candidates perform better. 16
A second explanation is that internal candidates spend years developing firm-specific
capital. 17 As employees rise through the ranks of a company, they learn not only the
industry, but also what makes their particular organization run.18 They build up relational
capital, enabling them to navigate the intricacies of the company.19 They understand the
strengths and weaknesses of the organization, and can hit the ground running with
relatively little time required to acclimate to their new role.
Information asymmetry, a third explanation, focuses not on what the internal
candidate knows about the firm, but instead on what the board knows about the internal
candidate.20 Internal candidates participate, in a real sense, in a years-long interview
process. Boards generally have a sense of a current employee's reputation within the
organization, and likely have worked with them and interacted with them socially on a
variety of occasions.21 Boards are at a comparative disadvantage when it comes to external
candidates. They generally have relatively little time to interview outsiders and conduct
due diligence as to their character, work habits, and knowledge. Typically, the external
candidate is interviewing in secret, further limiting the board's ability to investigate an
22
individual's character and attributes.
The final explanation for public company boards favoring internal candidates is to
would result in raids of talent by other firms . . .").
14. See infra notes 63-79 and accompanying text (describing the literature on CEO selection).
15. Id. (describing the literature on selection of internal or external candidates for CEO positions).
16. Mark R. Huson et al., ManagerialSuccession andFirm Performance,74 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 238 (2004)
("The evidence on the consequences of these managerial replacement decisions is not so clear.").
17. See Eugene P.H. Furtado & Michael S. Rozeff, The Wealth Effects of Company InitiatedManagement

Changes, 18 J. FtN. ECON. 147, 152 (1987) (discussing the advantage of firm-specific capital internal candidates
have over external candidates).
18. See Anup Agrawal et al., Are outsiders handicapped in CEO successions?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 619, 620

(2006) (discussing the potential for internal managers to build knowledge and relationships while working within
the firm).

19.

Id.

20. See, e.g., Edward J. Zajac, CEO Selection, Succession, Compensation and Firm Performance: A
Theoretical Integration and Empirical Analysis, 11 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 217, 219 (1990) (arguing that the
differences between internal and external candidates arise out of the principal-agent relationship of the Board and

CEO).
21. Id. at 220 ("It seems more likely that the Board has had the opportunity to update its ability estimate of
an insider CEO candidate more accurately over multiple [time] periods.").
22. Id.
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foster a tournament system that incentivizes lower ranks, and keeps them competing for
the ultimate prize of leadership over the organization. 23 When it is hard for employers to
monitor output reliably, then it may be preferable to structure a "tournament" that enables
the employer to measure, and ultimately rank, employees against one another rather than
against an objective output measure.24 Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay famously applied
this principle to promotion at a law firm: associates compete in a tournament against one
another, for the prize of making partner. 25
Economists Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen give an excellent example of how
their theory plays out in explaining executive compensation. Typically, the "salary of...
the vice-president of a 3articular corporation is substantially below that of the president of
the same corporation.' 6 Yet, somehow, "on the day that a given individual is promoted
from vice-president to president, his salary may triple. It is difficult to argue that his skills
have tripled in that one-day period ....
But this compensation structure is not surprising
if viewed as a tournament, where high CEO pay reflects not current productivity as
president, but rather efforts exerted at lower levels to compete in pursuit of CEO status. 28
The practice of favoring internals reassures current employees that there is a limited pool
of competition for the grand prize, and that outsiders will not swoop in to claim the reward
an internal aspirant has spent a substantial portion of her career working towards.
No articles have discussed in depth which of these theories-firm-specific capital,
information asymmetry, or tournament theory-best explains the favoring of internal
candidates. This Article offers support for the tournament theory, by way of an unexplored
source: the academic leadership market.
Academia offers an ideal setting to test the power of tournament theory for a simple
reason: tenured academics do not engage in a leadership tournament.29 The other two
explanations for favoring internal candidates, firm-specific capital and information
asymmetry, still apply: internal candidates know more about their university, and the
institution knows more about them, as compared to outsiders. 30 Tournament theory, in
contrast, does not apply. 3 1 The typical academic professes something of a horror of

23.

See Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY

L.J. 1557, 1559 (2005) ("[In the tournament model,] compensation is not a variable reward that increases directly
with absolute performance. Instead, it is designed to motivate employees to compete for promotions by providing

positive wage spreads between each level of the organizational hierarchy and the next higher level.").
24.

See Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, 89

J. POL. EcON. 841, 848-49 (1981) ("[T]he costs of measurement for each conceivable candidate are prohibitively
expensive. Instead, it might be said that those in the running are 'tested' by assessments of performance at lower

positions.").
25.

MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENTOF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG

LAW FIRM (1991).
26.

Lazear & Rosen, supra note 24, at 847.

27.
28.

Id.
Id.

29.

See infra Part IV.

30.
31.

Id.
Marlene 1. Strathe & Vicki W. Wilson, Academic Leadership: The Pathway To and From, 134 NEW

DIRECTIONS IN HIGHER EDUc. 5, 7 (2006) ("[Fiaculty members are prepared through their degree programs for
teaching, research and scholarship, and service responsibilities, not administrative roles.").
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administration, sometimes termed moving to the "dark side." 32 Thus, if the tournament
theory is the dominant explanation for favoring internal candidates in the for-profit setting,
internal candidates should not be as favored in the academic setting. If, in contrast, firmspecific capital or informational asymmetry explain the dominance of internal candidates,
then internal candidates should likewise predominate in the academic leadership setting.
I conduct a study from 1995-2016 of top fifty university presidents, and find support
for the tournament theory of CEO selection. Only 24% of the presidents of leading
universities are internal. This notable bias in favor of external candidates in a setting with
no tournament, but where firm-specific capital and information asymmetry still exist,
suggests that tournament theory explains the internal CEO bias. The implications for
explaining why public firms favor internal CEOs are profound.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the debate surrounding executive
pay levels. Notably, the optimal contracting view identifies the market for managerial
talent as one justification for high rates of executive pay. However, given the strong
tendency to favor internal candidates, such a market may be more fiction than fact. Part III
describes the potential reasons for preferring inside candidates: firm-specific capital,
information asymmetry, and tournament theory. Part IV moves to the academic setting to
test the tournament theory. After establishing the absence of an academic leadership
tournament and describing the process of selecting a university president, this Part briefly
surveys the scant literature on university presidents. Part V provides the data, a sample of
university presidents in schools regularly ranked in the U.S. News top fifty universities
from 1995-2016. The main finding is that external candidates predominate. I test for
gender, public versus private institution, and state system versus sole-governed institution,
and fail to find statistically significant results. Part V offers implications for executive
compensation.
II. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CONTROVERSY AND REFORM

Legal scholars have focused a great deal of attention on the compensation contract
between CEO and firm, and in particular on the question of whether executive pay is
"excessive." The "optimal contracting" school argues that executive pay is not excessive,
but is instead the product of efficient bargaining between board and CEO. 33 "Managerial
power" advocates, in contrast, believe that executives are in fact overpaid, because CEOs
effectively set their own pay: mana ers wield a great deal of de facto power over boards
that are independent in name only.
32.

See, e.g., Susan J. Becker, Thanks, But I'm Just Looking: Or, Why I Don't Want to Be a Dean, 49 J.

LEGAL EDUC. 595, 595 (1999) (describing her time as an administrator as being on "the dark side").
33.

See John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 FED. RES. BANK

N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 27, 27 (2003) ("[E]fficient contract[s] . .

maximize[ ] the net expected economic value

to shareholders after transaction costs .... An equivalent way of saying this is we assume that contracts minimize
agency costs."); see also, Anabtawi, supra note 23, at 1561; Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory ofAgency:

The Principal'sProblem, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 134, 138 (1973) ("We may conclude, then, that the class of payoff
structures that simultaneously solve the principal's problem and lead to Pareto efficiency . . is quite important
and quite likely to arise in practice.").
34. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 766-73 (2002) (describing various ways corporate management exerts
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The optimal contracting model presumes that the board bargains with the CEO to
serve the corporation as a whole, and shareholders in particular. 35 The classic problem with
CEO compensation is an agency problem: the risk that the CEO, though the corporation's
agent and bound to serve it in good faith, will not in fact serve as the principal would
wish.36 Aside from garden-variety shirking or stealing, CEOs also impose a more insidious
agency cost on investors. Generally greater returns require greater risk, but CEOs will be
relatively risk averse for fear of losing their jobs. 37 Thus, they will be more cautious with
the management of the firm than shareholders would prefer.
Under the optimal contracting view, boards, as faithful agents of the corporation, will
enter into efficient compensation contracts that will compensate their managers for running
risks on shareholders' behalf.38 For example, golden parachutes protect CEOs from their
own failures. If the CEO decides on a risky course that does not pan out, he can nonetheless
reap some payment from the firm even if he is fired for poor performance. 39 This
"parachute" offers him the security to run risks in the first place, risks that may be wealthmaximizing to shareholders in the aggregate. Another example is stock-based
compensation, which aligns the CEO's compensation with the firm's performance, and
thus with shareholders' interests. 40 CEOs can take higher risks with the firm, compensated
for risking their human capital with the knowledge that they will share alongside the firm's
other owners if those higher risks translate into in higher reward.
In contrast, the managerial contracting model views executive compensation as being
excessive, the product of weak boards under the thumb of powerful managers.41 Lucian
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried made the case for this position in their book, Pay without
Performance.42They argue that stock options do not reward CEO's for good performance,
because their value may increase because of macroeconomic conditions or industryspecific factors that have nothing to do with their particular firm's performance.43
Compensation truly geared towards rewarding performance would control for these factors

power over "nominally independent" boards, including influence over the appointment of directors, overall board
dynamics, and insufficient information).
35.

PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 217-18 (1992).

36.

Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs

and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) ("In most agency relationships the principal and the

agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs . .. and in addition there will be some divergence between
the agent's decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal.").

37. Michael J. Mannor et al., Heavy Lies the Crown? How Job Anxiety Affects Top Executive Decision
Making in Gain and Loss Contexts, 37 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1968, 1984 (2016) ("We specifically demonstrate
that more
38.
39.
managers
40.
executive

41.

anxious top executives tend to avoid risks in their strategic decisions.").
See Core et al., supra note 33, at 28 ("[O]n average the system is efficient within transaction costs.").
Bebchuk et al., supra note 34, at 834 ("Some researchers have argued that golden parachutes encourage
to take desirable risks . . . .").
See Anabtawi, supranote 23, at 1563 (suggesting that increased "pay-performance sensitivity" aligns
and shareholder interests).

Bebchuk et al., supra note 34, at 837 (noting a weak or ineffectual board as a factor in increased

managerial power).
42. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
43. See id. at 140 (describing how boosts in stock price from industry- and market-wide factors result in
rewards to executives without affecting "managers' incentives for good performance").
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and only reward performance measured by metrics within the CEO's control. These
scholars advocate for increased disclosure and for empowering shareholders in order to
counter CEO's ability to pressure the board into overly favorably pay packages-that is,
into "excessive" levels of compensation. 44
In the political arena, reformers have been quick to decry the unfairness and inequity
of "excessive" executive pay. The 1986 Tax Code revisions added Section 162(m), which
effectively limits CEO compensation by providing that no more than $1 million in salary
be tax deductible. 4 5 Ironically, an important exception-for performance-based
compensation such as stock options-set the stage for yet larger amounts of compensation,
because it encouraged what some termed the "profligate" issuance of stock options as CEO
compensation.46
Since the 1980s, reformers have used one main tool to curb "excessive" pay, with
limited amounts of success: disclosure. 47 This Part will describe disclosure requirements
in place before the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank"), 48 but defer discussion of
specific Dodd-Frank provisions such as pay versus performance disclosures, "say on pay"
votes and pay ratio disclosures, until Part VI. The optimal contract school likely views each
of these measures as ham-handed over-regulation, and this Article will argue that they are,
in fact, misguided, because they do not provide shareholders with information needed to
evaluate executive pay.
A. The Problem With Disclosure: The Marketfor External CEOs is not Robust
Disclosure is the main mechanism by which securities law works. 49 Unsurprisingly,
the first tool for limiting executive compensation was mandated disclosure of
compensation packages. The original theory was that disclosing executive compensation
levels alone would serve as a check on excessive pay. 50 Either corporations would be
shamed by overpaying their CEOs or outraged shareholders would balk at paying the CEO

44.
45.

See id. at 206-16 (discussing increased shareholder influence over director selection).
26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (1986).

46.

Arthur H. Kohn, The Regulation of Executive Compensation: Unintended Consequences (Mostly),

Unexpected Achievements (Say What?), and the SEC's New Rules (No Mas!), 2016 WL 676116, at *2 ("What
Congress failed to anticipate was how Section 162(m)'s deductibility cap, taken together with other factorsmost notably favorable accounting treatment for stock options-would encourage what some argue was the
profligate use of stock options that led to the dot-com bubble, the backdated options scandal of the dot-com era,
and the corporate fraud carried out by Enron executives.").
47.

See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There's a Problem, What's the Remedy? The

Case for 'Compensation Disclosure and Analysis' 16 (Columbia Law Sch. Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 273,
2005) (calling for disclosures to report the "bottom line" of executive compensation); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin
J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay, But How, 68 HARv. Bus. REv. 138, 144 (May/June

1990) (discussing government mandated disclosures that keep executive pay visible).
48. See 12 U.S.C. Ch. 53 (2010).
49.

See George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 132 (1973) ("Indeed, the Securities Exchange Act is described
in its title and usually referred to as a "disclosure statute.").
50. Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of CorporateGovernance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783, 807-

08 (1994) ("Following a public outcry over the size of executive compensation, the Commission reacted in 1992
by adopting a rule that required increased disclosure of executive compensation in the annual proxy statement.").
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"too much." 5 1 It is widely believed, however, that disclosure has increasedCEO pay levels.
Not only do "inflated executive egos demand inflated executive pay,"52 but the process by
which compensation committees work compounds the problem. They hire compensation
consultants who "benchmark," that is, survey the compensation of the CEO's of rival
firms. 53
Nearly every corporate board believes that their CEO is above average, and should be
compensated accordingly, 54 in a process that has been dubbed the "Lake Wobegon
Effect." 55 Accordingly, "pay inevitably rises." 56 For example, Time Warner, seeking "to
attract and retain high-caliber executive[s]," generally targets compensation at the seventyfifth percentile of companies in its three peer groups. 57 Obviously, if each corporation acts
in a similar way, overall averages will quickly rise.
Companies justify these polices by looking to the market for managerial talent. The
rationale is that if they do not pay their CEOs well, more generous corporations will raid
their ranks and leave a managerial vacuum. 58 The presumption of a robust external market
for managerial underpins the concept of benchmarkin. If such a market exists, then
benchmarking is necessary in order to retain the CEO. If such a market does not exist,
then disclosure of CEO compensation alone will only increase compensation-and will not
provide useful information to shareholders because it is divorced from any useful data with
which to compare.
In this vein, Steven A. Bank, Brian R. Cheffins, and Harwell Wells look at CEO
compensation over time, and conclude that the rise of the market for managerial talent
explains the rise in CEO compensation. They argue that "[i]f companies are competing
intensely in the market for managerial talent to retain or recruit senior executives, this
should bolster the bargaining power of these executives and drive up managerial
compensation."60 They assert an increase, beginning in the 1970s, in companies'
willingness to hire external CEOs, and cite evidence of increased CEO turnover in the
1980s. 61

51.

Charles Elson, What's Wrong with Executive Compensation?, 81 HARv. Bus. REv. 68, 76 (2003)

(statement of Brian Hall) ("The idea was that if we shed some light on the problem, CEOs and boards would get
embarrassed and maybe the problem would disappear.").
52. Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock-Salary and Options Too: The Looting ofCorporateAmerica, 69 MD.
L. REv. 419, 447 (2010).
53.

Martin J. Conyon et al., CompensationConsultants and Executive Pay: Evidencefrom the UnitedStates

and the United Kingdom, 23 ACAD. MGMT. PERS. 43, 45-46 (2009) (discussing how benchmarking leads to
ratcheted up pay).
54.

See Davis, supra note 52 ("Nearly all major corporations target their executive compensation levels to

exceed the mean compensation among their peer groups.").
55.

See Elson & Ferrere, supra note 10, at 499 (referring to this effect, which is based on Garrison Keillor's

Lake Wobegon where "every child is above average").
56.

Davis, supra note 52.

57.

Id.

58. See Elson & Ferrerre, supra note 10, at 504 ("Failure to respond to the external market environment
would result in raids of talent by other firms .... ).

59.

See id. at 449 (discussing how upward adjustments of executive pay to at least the "going rate" are

necessary for retention).

60.
61.

Steven A. Bank et al., Executive Pay: What Worked?, 42 J. CORP. L. 59, 96 (2016).
Id. at 97-99 (discussing the changes in the market for managerial talent during these time periods).
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In fact, the "market" for external managerial talent may be something of a misnomer.
Empirically, there is little evidence that a market for external CEOs exists at all.
Traditionally, insiders dominated CEO successions. In the 1970s and 1980s, only 15% of
CEOs came from outside the corporation.62 Another study, of the period from between
1974-95, found less than 20% of CEOs were external. 63
In the late 2000s, however, outside candidates gained ground, accounting for "almost
one-third of new CEO hires." 64 The proportionate increase in outsider representation has
been cited as evidence of the increased importance of generalized managerial skills that an
executive can easily transfer from firm to firn. 65 Furthermore, the advent of computers
allowed for the compilation and access of a multitude of firm-specific data, rendering firmspecific knowledge less important than in the past. Thus, external CEOs have become
stronger candidates over time.
Yet those who concluded that this increase in external candidates would continue, or
even increase, presumed too much. The uptick in outsider hiring did not persist. 66 Although
external CEOs are more common than they were in the past, they are still relatively rare.
Hiring from within remains the "dominant mode of CEO succession in American
corporations."67 In the four-year period from 2012-15, the proportion of S&P 500
companies hiring outside CEOs, registered at around 22%.68 Internal candidates are the
first resort, and the choice of an external CEO is usually "[a] judgment by directors that no
competent successor candidate is available within their firm." 69
Indeed, the management literature implicitly discounts the external market for CEOs
by emphasizing the importance of succession planning. Succession planning-meanin the
fostering of a pipeline of internal candidates groomed to take over from a predecessor

62. See Elson & Ferrere, supra note 10, at 506 (explaining how "[a]bout 15% of CEO successions involved
the appointment of an outside executive in the 1970s and 1980s.").
63. Agrawal et al., supra note 18 ("Most often, firms choose to promote insiders. For large U.S. firms over
the period 1974-1995, better than 80% (848 out of 1035) of all CEO successions involved the promotion of an
insider to the CEO position.").
64. Charles M. Yablon, Is the Marketfor CEOs Rational?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 89, 115 (2007) (citing
RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs

141 n.14 (2002)).
65.

See Elson & Ferrere, supra note 10, at 506-07 (citing Kevin Murphy & JAn Zibojnik, Managerial

Capitaland the Marketfor CEOs (Queens Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 1110, 2007)).
66. See Karen Schnatterly & Scott G. Johnson, Competing to be CEO in High-tech Firms: Insider, Board
Member, or Outsider Candidates, 18 J. HIGH TECH. MGMT. RES. 132, 134 (2008) (explaining that "[tlhe most
common form of succession is that of an internal appointment. Of all the CEOs of the current Fortune 100 firms,
fewer than 10 have been appointed from outside."); William Chan, External Recruitment versus Internal

Promotion, 14 J. LAB. ECON. 555, 555-56 (1996) (citing similar numbers in the Fortune 100).
67. Yablon, supra note 64; Huson et al., supra note 16, at 242 ("Most top management appointees are
selected from among firm insiders, those who are already senior officers of the firm.").
68. Aguirre et al., supra note 7; see also Elson & Ferrere, supra note 10, at 506 (citing 2012 CEO
Transitions,SPENCERSTUART (Dec. 31, 2012)) (citing SpencerStuart to show that for the years 2007 to 2012, the

proportion of S&P 500 CEOs hiring externally ranged from 20-27%).
69. Wei Shen & Albert A. Cannella Jr., Revisiting the Performance Consequences ofCEO Succession: The
Impacts of Successor Type, Postsuccession Senior Executive Turnover, and Departing CEO Tenure, 45 ACAD.

MGMT. J. 717, 722 (2002).
70.

William J. Rothwell, Replacement Planning: A Starting Point for Succession Planning and Talent

Management, 15 INT'L J. TRAINING & DEV. 87, 87 (2011) ("succession planning ...

focuses on developing a pool
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is of crucial importance at most leading firms.71 The SEC has characterized succession

planning as "a significant policy [and governance] issue" for boards "so that [a] company
is not adversely affected due to a vacancy in leadership."72 The presumption is that
succession planning is part of a successful business, to the point that one academic
remarked, "make no mistake about it: no matter how successful [an] outsider may
ultimately be, his or her recruitment by definition is the result of failure." 73 Seen in this
light, benchmarking-that is, looking outside the organization to take cues for executive
pay levels-is fundamentally misguided. The likelihood of a CEO being "poached" if paid
less than market is low-unless benchmarking and uniformly high CEO compensation are
inhibiting an otherwise robust market.
This Article is not the first to identify the lack of an external CEO market. Charles M.
Elson and Craig K. Ferrere made this point as part of a larger argument about excessive
executive compensation. Without such a market, disclosure alone will only prompt
benchmarking, which ratchets up pay for no reason. Part III will argue that understanding
the reason for the lack of an external CEO market-why, in other words, firms favor
internal candidates-can inform the framing of mandatory disclosure rules that provide
more relevant information to shareholders.
Having established the rarity of the external CEO, I turn next to the focal question of
this Article: the explanation for the dominance of the internal hire.
III. WHY FAVOR AN INTERNAL CANDIDATE?

While the literatures of several disciplines focus on the relative performance of
internal versus externally sourced leaders, few have focused on why insider candidates
dominate the field. This question is a vitally important one for any organization: the tasks
of selecting a CEO, monitoring her performance, and deciding when to replace her
constitute one of the board's most important jobs. 74 In most publicly traded firms, 7 5 the

of people to consider for promotion[.]"); Yeonsoo Kim, Measuring the Value of Succession Planning and
Management: A QualitativeStudy ofMultinationalCompanies, 23 PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT Q. 5, 5 (2010)

("In the 1980s, it centered on CEO succession practices and attendant issues. In the 1990s, succession planning
expanded its focus to include other key executive positions. And now it may include all employees in key
leadership positions."); Robert Barnett & Sandra Davis, Creating Greater Success in Succession Planning, 10
ADVANCES DEV. HUM. RES. 721, 721 (2008) ("Generally, however, succession planning refers to special efforts
to invest in the best, highest performing, or highest potential talent at any organizational level or function, but
particularly at or near the top.").
71. Melissa F. Klein & Raintry Jean Salk, PresidentialSuccession Planning:A QualitativeStudy in Private

Higher Education, 20 J. LEADERSHIP & ORG. STUD. 335, 337 (2013) ("Succession planning has long been a part
of the corporate world.").
72. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (CF), 2009 WL 4363205, at *3 (Oct. 27, 2009).
73.

NOEL TICHY, SUCCESSION: MASTERING THE MAKE-OR-BREAK PROCESS OF LEADERSHIP TRANSITION

207 (2014).
74. Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict PrimacyModel ofthe Public Board, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051, 1085 (2013)
("[T]here is one function the board can perform, and perform better than any other corporate group: '[S]electing,
monitoring, and removing the members of the chief executive's office."' (quoting MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 170 (1976))); see DENNIS C. CAREY & DAYTON
OGDEN, CEO SUCCESSION 3 (2000) (noting "that succession has become a front-burner issue for directors").
75. Aside from controlled companies like Facebook, which are exempt from independence requirements.
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subset on which this Article focuses, the majority of the board must consist of independent
directors, i.e., directors who do not work for the corporation full time.76 Indeed, most public
companies are supermajority independent, so that only the CEO and perhaps one other fulltime employee sit on the board. Thus, most of the board of a publicly traded corporation
consists of outsiders-part-timers for whom their service to the corporation is not their
"day job." 77
I have argued elsewhere that the role of an outsider-dominated board of directors is
best understood as focusing primarily on areas where the managers face a conflict of
interest, areas like related party transactions or derivative suits.78 Paramount among these
conflicts is the evaluation of the performance of the CEO. By definition any full-time
employees ultimately report to the CEO, and thus cannot objectively evaluate her
performance. Only an outside body has the independence to perform this crucial task.
Despite the vital importance of the task of selecting the CEO, there remains a gap in
the literature: a clear reason why firms prefer internal candidates. Four explanations recur
repeatedly: performance, firm-specific capital, information asymmetry, and tournament
theory. The specific reason for favoring internals matters a great deal, both to questions of
compensation and performance. If firm-specific capital is the main driver, then the idea of
an external market for managers is mere fantasy because each candidate's highest and best
use is as CEO of the specific firm they know best. If, instead, information asymmetry
explains the preference for internals, then more lengthy or detailed diligence into external
candidates at the hiring stage may produce better results. And, if tournament theory is what
explains handicapping outsiders, then the performance of the CEO himself is in a real sense
immaterial. What matters is that the preference for internal CEOs fosters beneficial
competition within the firm. Thus, compensation should focus on the relationship of CEO
compensation to that of the next highest-ranking officers. CEOs' compensation should be
enough to incentivize them to compete for the top spot, but no higher. Again, the external
market will pale in significance because of the institutional benefits of putting a thumb on
the scale in favor of current employees. This Part will examine each explanation in turn.
A. Internal CandidatesPerform Better
A robust and varied debate exists in the literature over the fundamental "make or buy"
question: do external or internal leaders perform better? 7 9 Superior performance by firms
who promote CEOs internally relative to similarly situated firms led by external CEOs
would offer a clear reason for favoring an internal candidate. Luckily, many scholars have
examined the performance question. A detailed treatment of the literature on the
76. See, e.g., N.Y.S.E. MANUAL § 303A.01 (2009) ("Listed companies must have a majority ofindependent
directors."); NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULE (CCH) 1 5605(b)(1) (2009) ("A majority of the board of directors
must be comprised of Independent Directors .... ).
77. Rodrigues, supra note 74, at 1060 ("In reality, today most public corporations have supermajority
independent boards; indeed, often the CEO is the only employee-director.").

78.

See, e.g., id. at 1052 ("In such areas of conflict of interest the board's lack of ties to management

becomes a strength, and so it is on these subjects that the board should focus.").
79. See Beni Lauterbach et al., Internal vs. External Successions and Their Effect on Firm Performance,

52 HUM. REL. 1485, 1485 (1999) ("A frequently debated issue is the preferable source of top management
successions (external or internal).").
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relationship of CEO provenance to firm performance would span many disciplines and
require at least twice the length of this Article. 80 A brief survey of the field reveals the
question has provoked intense attention.
Twenty-five years ago, Edward J. Zajac could already observe "[t]he study of CEO
succession (the selection of a replacement CEO) and organizational performance has had
a long history," citing studies stretching back to 1962.81 Ayse Karaevli in 2007 cataloged
published empirical research on the consequences of CEO succession from 1954-2005,
and listed 52 separate entries.82 Just as notable as the sheer number of studies were the
varied settings in which they take place. Scholars have looked at the effect of leadership
succession in general, or on the effect of the outsider/insider choice, in the various business
contexts, from the CEOs of Fortune 500 firms,83 to CEOs of large firms,84 CEOs of small
firms,85 CEOs following the death of the predecessor,86 CEOs in financially distressed
firms, CEOs of Japanese companies, CEOs of cement firms,89 and CEOs of small
Iowan telephone firms. 90 Succession research did not limit itself to the business field,
however, and scholars explored effects on school superintendents, 9 1 plant managers, 92

80. There is a vast amount of literature on corporate succession, spanning numerous fields, because of its
"unusually broad attraction as a pursuit of scholarly research . . . ."Robert C. Giambatista et al., Nothing Succeeds
Like Succession: A Critical Review of Leader Succession Literature Since 1994, 16 LEADERSHIP Q. 963, 965

(2005). The question is of logical interest to management studies. Finance scholars find it of equal interest, who
focus largely on agency theory and the effect of leadership selection on the financial performance of the firm. Id.
at 977. But there are many other disciplines with interest in the topic, which view it through varied lenses:

"sociologists [who emphasize] bureaucratization and adaptation[], social theorists [who emphasize] leadership
change's relationship to organizational effectiveness[], organizational behavior and human resources scholars

[who emphasize] managing the process and its impact on careers and coping[], and strategists [who emphasize]
achieving competitive advantage[]." Id. at 965.
81. Edward J. Zajac, CEO Selection, Succession, Compensation and Firm Performance: A Theoretical

Integration and EmpiricalAnalysis, 11 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 217, 219 (1990).
82. Ayse Karaevli, Performance Consequences of New CEO 'Outsiderness':Moderating Effects of Preand Post-Succession Contexts, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 681, 683-85 (2007).
83. Wallace N. Davidson I, et al., Key Executive Succession and Stockholder Wealth: The Influence of

Successor's Origin, Position, andAge, 16 J. MGMT. 647 (1990).
84.

Michael H. Lubatkin et al., Stockholder Reactions to CEO Changes in Large Corporations,32 ACAD.

MGMT. J. 47 (1989).
85. Donald B. Trow, Executive Succession in Small Companies, 6 ADMIN. SC. Q. 228 (1961).
86. Dan L. Worrell & Wallace N. Davidson 111, The Effect of CEO Succession on Stockholder Wealth in
Large Firms Following the Death ofthe Predecessor, 13 J. MGMT. 509 (1987).
87. Karl-Adam Bonnier & Robert F. Bruner, An Analysis of Stock PriceReaction to Management Change

in DistressedFirms, 11 J. ACCT. & ECON. 95 (1989).
88.

Tomoaki

Sakano & Arie Y.

Lewin, Impact of CEO Succession in Japanese Companies: A

Coevolutionary Perspective, 10 ORG. SC. 654 (1999).
89. Michael L. Tushman & Lori Rosenkopf, Executive Succession, Strategic Reorientation and
PerformanceGrowth: A LongitudinalStudy in the U.S. Cement Industry, 42 MGMT. SC. 939 (1996).
90. Heather A. Haveman, Ghosts ofManagersPast:ManagerialSuccession and OrganizationalMortality,
36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 864 (1993).
91. Richard 0. Carlson, Succession and Performance among School Superintendents, 6 ADMIN. SCI. Q.

210 (1961).
92. Richard H. Guest, ManagerialSuccession in Complex Organizations, 68 AM. J. SOC. 47 (1962).
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baseball coaches,93 NCAA basketball coaches,94 NBA coaches,95 NFL coaches,96 and
Methodist ministers,97 to name but a few contexts.
Yet, despite this large body of research, the cumulative results are inconclusive, at
best. 98 The "most consistent finding in the literature" is that poor firm erformance is
associated with increased rates of succession, i.e., increased CEO turnover. Beyond that,
as Karaevli writes, "[s]cholars have failed to reach a consensus on whether succession
events in general, and insider vs. outsider successions in particular, affect firm performance
Conventional wisdom has it that poorly
positively, negatively, or insignificantly.' ,0o
performing firms will favor external candidates, because of the sense that change is
External candidates are not bound by "the old policies and implicit contracts"
required.
and can provide "new perspectives, fresh ideas, and decisive actions."102 Yet, Beni
Lauterbach, Joseph Vu, and Jacob Weisberg observe that, "[d]espite the strong intuitive
appeal of the above arguments, their empirical support is weak . . . . There is evidence that
poor performance increases the frequency of successions, but there is no conclusive
1 03
evidence that poor performance triggers external successions."
In sum, despite considerable attention from several distinct disciplines, concrete
findings regarding the relationship between CEO provenance and firm performance have
proved illusory. The most that can reliably be asserted is that firm performance is inversely
correlated with the likelihood of a succession event-that is, if a firm is performing poorly,
it is more likely that its CEO will be replaced. Conversely, a firm performing well will be
relatively unlikely to replace its CEO. One central fact remains clear, although largely
taken for granted: most CEOs come from within an organization. That fact should have an
impact, on a topic much discussed in the legal literature: executive compensation.
We have chalked superior performance off the list of reasons to favor internal CEO
candidates. Three more explanations remain: firm-specific capital, information asymmetry,
93. Michael Patrick Allen et al. ManagerialSuccession and OrganizationalPerformance:A Recalcitrant
Problem Revisited, 24 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 167 (1979); Oscar Grusky, ManagerialSuccession and Organizational
Effectiveness, 69 AM. J. SOC. 21 (1963).
94. D. Stanley Eitzen & Norman R. Yetman, Managerial Change, Longevity, and Organizational

Effectiveness, 17 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 110 (1972).
95. Jeffrey Pfeffer & Alison Davis-Blake, Administrative Succession and OrganizationalPerformance:
How AdministratorExperience Mediates the Succession Effect, 29 ACAD. MGMT. J. 72 (1986).
96. M. Craig Brown, Administrative Succession and OrganizationalPerformance: The Succession Effect,

27 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 1 (1982).
97. Jonathan E. Smith et al., Leadership:It Can Make a Difference, 27 ACAD. MGMT. J. 765 (1984).
98.

See Huson et al., supra note 16, at 238 ("The evidence on the consequences of these managerial

replacement decisions is not so clear."); Zajac, supra note 20 (noting that the field "has been viewed as suffering
from the lack of cumulative knowledge").

99.
100.

Giambatista et al., supra note 80, at 964.
Karaevli, supra note 82, at 682; see also Randolph P. Beatty & Edward J. Zajac, CEO Change and

Firm Perjbrmancein Large Corporations:Succession Effects and ManagerEffects, 8 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 305,

305 (1987) ("[U]nderstanding the general relationship between managerial succession and organizational
performance has proven an elusive goal, despite over two decades of research attention in the organization theory
literature.").

101.
102.
103.

See Lauterbach et al., supra note 79, at 1486.
Id.
Id.; see also Karaevli, supra note 82, at 686 ("[T]he performance consequences of new CEO origin

have also been characterized by mixed results.").
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and the incentive effect of an internal tournament for CEO.
B. Firm-Specific Capital
Firm-specific capital is "perhaps the most often cited" explanation for internal
promotion.
Both employer and employee know the value of maintaining the employee
in the firm: each day the employee invests more of his human capital in understanding not
only how his specific industry works, but how to function best within his specific firm.
Conversely, the employer benefits from investing in the success of its employees. "And
the longer the tenure of the worker, the more specific human capital accumulated, and the
more costly it would be for the firm to find an external candidate who could outperform an
existing worker within the setting of the firm." 105
Put simply, insiders know the firm. 106 They have pre-existing social networks, and
are intimately familiar with-indeed, have often shaped-corporate strategy.lo7 They
Insiders, with their superior
provide the firm with continuity in the midst of succession.
knowledge of the firm and relationships formed by working within it, would under this
view naturally outperform external candidates who lack these characteristics. 109 They
know about the specific production technologies the firm uses, its standard operating
procedures, and the product markets in which the firm competes. 110
Moreover, their knowledge of the firm's relative position in the market, including the
development of corporate strategy, "requires the intimate knowledge, coordination, and
direction of complex, interrelated corporate assets and personnel.""' Effective managers
draw "on an accumulated specific knowledge of a company's culture, strengths,
weaknesses, and interpersonal dynamics." 12 They have developed and implemented firm
policies as managers, and are thus in a better position to implement them on a broader
scale.113 With their intimate knowledge of the firm, they may even have invested their
capital in areas where they have a comparative advantage over others. 114
If firm-specific capital is what drives firms to favor internal candidates, then that fact
has profound ramifications for the CEO market. In point of fact, it all but eliminates the
idea of an external market for managerial talent. As Elson points out: "If an executive's
productivity is mainly derived from firm-specific knowledge and skills, which have little
value elsewhere, the executives themselves will have little value to outside firms. In such
104. Chan, supra note 66, at 556.
105. Id.
106. Karaevli, supra note 82, at 687 ("[The continuity view of successions highlights] the importance of
insiders' greater knowledge of the firm and established networks for achieving continuity.").
107. See Lauterbach et al., supra note 79 (discussing the benefits generally highlighted by proponents of
internal succession).
108. Id.
109. Agrawal et al., supra note 18; see also Karaevli, supranote 82, at 687; Zajac, supra note 20.
110. James P. Guthrie & Deepak K. Datta, CorporateStrategy, Executive Selection, andFirm Performance,
37 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 101, 102 (1998); Robert Parrino, CEO Turnover and Outside Succession-A CrossSectional Analysis, 46 J. FIN. ECON. 165, 168 (1996).
Ill. Elson & Ferrere, supranote 10, at 506.
112. Id.
113. Parrino, supra note 110, at 167.
114. Id at 168.
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stuck with their current employer, unable to be similarly
a case the executive is essentially
1
15
elsewhere."
productive
But, firm-specific capital is not the only reason scholars posit for the preference for
internal hires. The second explanation focuses not on what the internal candidate knows
about the firm, but instead what the firm-specifically the board-knows about the internal
candidate.
C. Information Asymmetry
The information asymmetry explanation posits that boards confront a great deal of
confounding information when evaluating external candidates, and may prefer to go with
the "less uncertain" prospect of an internal candidate. 116 Compounding the information
asymmetry problem is the fact that, at least among publicly-traded corporations, the
overwhelming majority of the board will be independent-that is, the board will be
composed of outsiders who do not work full-time in the corporation they oversee. 117 Thus,
unlike hiring lower down the corporate ladder, when it comes to the CEO, "decisions
frequently rest in the hands of individuals who may be relatively unfamiliar with the
organization and its internal processes." l8
Edward Zajac argues most directly for the information asymmetry explanation.119 His
study posits that the board of directors of a firm engaged in evaluating potential CEO
candidates suffers from a basic information asymmetry problem.120 While traditionally the
law and economics literature has focused on information asymmetries in the context of the
agent's decision-making, at the outset of the relationship a formidable information
asymmetry exists-that is, in selecting the agent in the first place, the principal suffers from
a lack of information regarding "the characteristics of the agent, e.g. ability, risk-aversion,
or propensity to leave an organization."121 At the hiring stage, the board is at an
informational disadvantage because the would-be CEO may have secret, negative
information about their characteristics relevant to the hiring decision, but these remain
122
unknown to the board.
All things being equal, the board is more likely to be able to distinguish the qualities
of an internal candidate as compared to an external one. Put in simple terms, the internal
candidate is a known quantity, and is progressively better known the longer the board has
the opportunity to observe them over time. 123 "A board of directors usually interacts with
an insider candidate on many occasions, and therefore has a chance to observe his or her

115.

Elson & Ferrere, supranote 10, at 505.

116. Chan, supra note 66, at 556.
117. Rodrigues, supra note 74, at 1060 ("In reality, today most public corporations have supermajority
independent boards; indeed, often the CEO is the only employee-director.").
118.

Lauterbach et al., supra note 79, at 1489 (quoting Idalene F. Kesner & Terrence C. Sebora, Executive

Succession: Past, Present & Future, 20 J. MGMT. 327, 329 (1994)).
119. Zajac, supra note 20, at 220.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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behavior and personality traits under different circumstances." 1 24 In contrast, the board has
few such opportunities regarding external candidates.125 Outside candidates from different
industries pose even more difficulties in terms of assessment.126 Because of this difficulty
in accurately assessing whether the candidate's abilities match the requirements of the firm,
the board may choose a successor poorly suited to the job of CEO.
A variant is the "cozy insider" theory, that a board may favor an internal candidate
even over stronger outside candidates, because of laziness or a too-cozy relationship with
the insider: 128

Internal candidates also seem to have closer relations with the board of directors
members. Thus, it appears that sometimes an internal candidate is selected to
office despite the fact that an external succession might be optimal. In contrast,
it is likely that an external candidate was appointed only after a comprehensive
search during which the candidate proved herself or himself superior to other
external and internal candidates for the post. The above analysis suggests that on
average firms that recruited from outside got a more skillful CEO than firms that
appointed from inside. 129
Under this view, boards favor internals based not on efficiency gains, but instead on
personal utility. The cozy insider view suggests that an external market could exist, if the
board focused on quality over familiarity.
If information asymmetry or the more troubling "cozy insider" variant, and not firmspecific capital, is the reason for favoring insiders, then the external market for managerial
talent remains a possibility, as long as successful managers are able to transplant their skills
to new firms. Some scholars do indeed argue that firm-specific capital is not as important
as good strong managerial skills, and that skilled managers can lead a variety of firms.
Proponents of generalizable management skills cite the recent increase in the rate of hiring
external CEOs (although that rate has, as described, dropped to about 22% after rising to
almost one third), and the increasing percentage of CEOs with MBAs as evidence. 130
If CEOs' managerial skills are transferable and firm-specific capital is not a crucial
part of their success, then firms can look outside of their internal labor market when
replacing a CEO. What is more, the converse of firms' ability to hire external CEOs is the
vulnerability of their own CEO to being poached from other firms. This wider external

124. Karaevli, supra note 82, at 688; see also Shen & Cannella Jr., supra note 69, at 719-20 ("[B]ecause of
their frequent exposure to their firms' boards of directors and other senior executives, coupled with their history
of performance inside the firms, the risk of adverse selection is relatively low.").

125.

See Karaevli, supra note 82, at 688 ("[B]oards usually face greater difficulties in acquiring ...

diverse

information about external candidates.").

126.

See id. ("[A] board of directors does not usually have a large amount of information about the best-

managed firms in a different industry, although they usually have that benchmark information about the firms in
their own industry.").
127. Shen & Cannella Jr., supra note 69, at 719 ("The risk of adverse selection arises because information
asymmetry between the board and successor candidates makes it difficult for the board to accurately assess if the
abilities of a potential successor match the needs of the firm.").
128. Lauterbach et al., supra note 79, at 1489.

129.
130.

Id.
Elson & Ferrere, supranote 10, at 506-07.
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market naturally increases CEO compensation, as firms benchmark in order to ensure that
their CEOs are being paid a market rate.131 As Elson puts it: "If, on the other hand, CEO
human capital is largely general, and therefore transferable between different companies,
the outside opportunities should more closely match wages, and executives should freely
move to their most efficient allocation."132 Elson himself vociferously disagrees, citing
empirical studies as well as, anecdotally, a move toward specialization at GE, the vaunted
executive training ground. He observes: "The CEO of a large company must know his
specific business well. A focused expertise is absolutely necessary to sustain a competitive
advantage in this difficult environment. 133Reliance upon general managerial skills,
principles, and techniques will not suffice."
If Elson is wrong, and if it is information asymmetry that drives the internal candidate
preference, then boards could perform more due diligence, arrange for test-runs, or
otherwise attempt to obtain further information about extemal candidates. If the cozy
insider explanation is the true one, however, internal candidates would continue to
dominate so long as boards share an inappropriately close relationship with internal
candidates.
So far, we have covered explanations that deal with the knowledge possessed by the
internal candidate (firm-specific capital) and the board (information asymmetry). The last
explanation shifts to another audience entirely. The focus is not on what the board or
candidate knows, but instead on the effect of the choice of intemal candidate has on the
rest of the firm's employees.
D. Tournament Theory
Classic economic toumament theory asserts that when it is difficult to monitor or
assess individual performance, firms adopt a tournament style of compensation. Firms will
effectively defer a portion of workers' compensation in exchange for the chance to be
promoted. Tournament theorists offer two justifications for this state of affairs: first, if it is
relatively difficult to measure individual employee's productivity, the firm cannot
compensate each one appropriately.1 34 There is simply no way to accurately measure how
much any individual is contributing. Typically in such settings, compensation is assessed
only by the employee's supervisor, in a manner that is inevitably subjective. 135 Firms are
thus faced with the problem of how to reward those who perform well without being able
to quantify exactly how much they have done.1 36 Rank-order tournaments, where firms
commit to promote from within, solve the problem because, with the tournament, "the firm
can depend upon the lure of the rewards associated with promotion (and the corresponding
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 494-95 (discussing the process boards typically use when benchmarking).
Id. at 505.
Id. at 510.

134.

David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament ofLawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and

Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets ofElite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REv. 1581, 1584 (1998).
135.

See James M. Malcomson, Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON.

486, 487 (1984) ("[P]erformance is frequently something that can be assessed only subjectively by, for example,
the judgment of a supervisor.").
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fear of not winning the competition) to motivate employees to exert high levels of effort
and care with relatively little supervision. At the end of the probationary period, firms
simply have to choose those employees who performed 'the best' among their peers.",137
A significant strand of tournament theory seeks to explain why rewards increase
disproportionately at the top ranks. Sherwin Rosen illustrates the phenomenon by way of
a tennis tournament analogy where "the top four ranks receive 50% or more of the total
purse . . ."138 The situation is generalizable: although executive pay exhibits less extreme
concentration at the top, most firms pay increases disproportionately as a worker ascends
the corporate hierarchy. Rosen uses tournament theory to explain this increase: without a
significant reward for competing further, the worker might be tempted to slack off and rest
on her laurels. 139 To incentivize employees to compete, the firm must pay them
proportionately more as they advance. On the flipside, employees can relatively easily
verify whether or not the firm keeps its promises by in fact paying higher ranks more as
they progress through the ranks. o In many ways, this theory explains what is largely
common sense: vice presidents who ascend to become CEO, with a concomitant doubling
in pay, did not become twice as productive overnight. Rather, the prospect of the CEO
prize made them more productive over the full measure of their working lives, and the CEO
salary is a final payout that rewards the years it took to get them to the ultimate position. 14 1
But, this application of tournament theory explains only why firms pay their higher
ranks well-it does not explain favoring internal candidates. William Chan argues that if
the tournament is open to all, moral hazard can arise. Recall that tournament theory focuses
on situations when the employer finds it hard to assess an individual's performance. Rankordering internal employees reduces the need to measure output precisely. But opening the
field, and allowing not only internal candidates (whose relative strength a worker can
evaluate against her own), but also external ones, "drastically reduces" an internal
candidate's prospect of winning, and therefore the incentive to compete for the prize at
all.142 The firm could compensate for the smaller chance of winning by promising a larger
prize, but then the firm has a greater incentive to cheat the internal candidate and avoid the
increased payout, and the internal contestants could be induced to sabotage one another. 143
In short, while balancing these countervailing concerns makes setting optimal pay contracts
tricky, tournament theory suggests that the goal is to set pay at a high enough level, and to
limit the field to internal candidates in order to provide a credible commitment that will
incentivize the firm's workers to compete.
Handicapping the external candidates solves this problem by setting the boundaries
of competition and limiting the field to a known pool of competitors. What is more, workers
can observe their employer's commitment over time to pay reward the winners of the

137.

Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 134.

138.

Sherwin Rosen, Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 701, 701

(1986).
139. Id. at 713.
140. See Malcomson, supra note 135, at 487 ("Whether or not [a firm] abides by [its agreement to pay some
employees higher wages] is something that can be verified by employees.").
141.

Lazear & Rosen, supranote 24, at 847.

142.
143.

Chan, supra note 66, at 556.
Id. at 556-57.
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internal tournament, with promotion being based on relative internal stature, 1 4 as opposed
to absolute, objective measures of performance that would obtain in a free market where
they would be judged against external candidates. And from the employees' perspective,
each can assess her own merits, as compared to that of her competition within the firm,
free from the fear that an unknown outsider will not surprise her by claiming the prize at
the end of her labors.
In less formalistic terms, tournaments "provide an incentive for insiders to work
hard." 145 Anup Agrawal, Charles R. Knoeber, and Theofanis Tsoulouhas argue that boards
handicap outsiders-that is, choose them only if "markedly better than the best insider"146
The CEO position is
in order to bolster the incentive of internal candidates to compete.
a prize-indeed, the ultimate prize in terms of the corporate employment hierarchy.1 47
Because a corporation gains by fostering competition and hard work by its executives at
all levels, it gains by strengthening the link between hard work and ultimate success.148
But because adding more contestants to the mix decreases the likelihood of an internal
candidate's success, it weakens his incentive to work. Favoring internal candidates (or
handicapping external candidates, however one phrases it) creates the optimal incentive
structure. 149 Less formal economic models also support the general implication of the
tournament theory, which is that firms may favor an internal candidate, independent of the
candidate's intrinsic merit or knowledge (firm-specific capital theory) or the board's
knowledge of the candidate (information asymmetry theory), but because of secondary
positive outcomes associated with favoring insiders. For example, Beni Lauterbach, Joseph
Employees
Vu, and Jacob Weisberg argue that "[i]nternal successions . . promote lo yalty.
1
feel more committed when upward mobility to the top rank is afforded."
Iman Anabtawi points out that the tournament theory offers one explanation of the
"pay without performance" that Bebchuk and Fried criticize. 151 If CEO pay is a prize to
induce competition in the lower ranks, then we should be unsurprised that CEO pay does
not reflect an individual CEO's performance.152 Under this view, the point of high
executive pay is not to compensate a particular CEO, but rather to motivate future CEOs
within the firm.153 Professor Anabtawi is correct-tournament theory could explain high
CEO pay-but only if tournament theory actually explains why firms favor internal
candidates for promotion.154 If a candidate's firm-specific capital or the board's

144. Id. at 557.
145. Agrawal et al., supra note 18 (citing Chan, supra note 66; Rosen, supra note 138; Lazear & Rosen,
supra note 24).
146. Id. at 619 ("Handicapping implies.. . that a firm will be more likely to choose an insider to succeed to
the CEO position where insiders are more comparable to each other, where outsiders are less comparable to
insiders, and where there are more inside candidates.").

147. Id. at 620.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 624 ("[F]irms will optimally impose a bigger handicap on outsiders making it more likely that
an insider will be selected.").
150. Lauterbach et al.,supra note 79, at 1485-86.
151. Anabtawi, supra note 23, at 1558.
152. Id. at 1560.
153. Id.
154.

Some scholars of CEO succession theory have posited variants of tournament theory. One such variant
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information asymmetry explains the bias for internals, then high CEO pay may instead
reflect undue managerial power over the board. The implication of tournament theory is
that what matters is not the quality of the internal candidate herself, but the effect of the
choice to source from within the firm.
If tournament theory is right in its predictions, then there should not be much of an
external market for managers because of the effects of external hires on the firm as a whole.
Under tournament theory, the decision to hire an external CEO is a signal of a radical lack
of confidence in the organizational pipeline, a slap in the face of would-be heirs apparent.
The internal costs of such a move are potentially high in terms of morale and motivation.
Before exploring the question of the root cause for the insider preference, however, we
should turn briefly to one final explanation for choice of leadership-one that denies that
it matters at all.
E. Irrelevance ofLeadership Theories
Before turning to the question of testing the three main theories, there remains one
category to discuss: two versions of the idea that the provenance of a firm's management
does not matter at all. First, the scapegoat hypothesis holds that managers are of equal
quality.155 If a firm's performance is poor, it is the product of bad luck, not bad
management.1 56 But in order to motivate managers to work hard at their job, they must be
threatened with replacement for poor performance. 157 Thus, "[b]oards of directors
understand that all managers are alike, but must fire managers of poorly performing firms
to induce other managers to provide the desired level of effort."
Thus, one should not
categorize managers on the basis of internal or external origin-these characteristics

is the power circulation theory of control, which views the firm as a battlefield on which different corporate
factions struggle for control. Following this view, Shen and Cannella subclassified internal successors into
contenders andfollowers. Contenders are internal candidates following a forced CEO departure, and "reflect[ ] a
successful internal power contest against the CEO [where] the successor ... has won the support and approval of
the board of directors." Shen & Cannella Jr., supra note 69, at 719. Thus, they begin the job with a mandate for
change, just as an outside candidate theoretically does. Id. Followers, in contrast, are internal successors that
follow a CEO's ordinary retirement, rather than unplanned firing. Id. They inherit the mantle of their predecessor
and are expected to maintain continuity with the prior regime. Id. Shen and Cannella distinguish between
contenders and followers in order to evaluate more carefully the performance outcomes of different kinds of
CEOs. For our purposes, the distinctional question of whether the tournament theory, firm-specific capital, or
information asymmetry explains favoring internal candidates does not matter. Whether anointing an internal
successor rewards a contest of pure merit or a successful internal faction, a tournament incentivizes the lower
ranks to continue to strive within the firm. Similarly, some studies have focused on "heirs apparent"-insiders

formally or informally designated as the organization's choice for future CEO. See Albert A. Cannella Jr. & Wei
Shen, So Close and Yet So Far: Promotion versus Exit for CEO Heirs Apparent, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 252, 252

(2001). These studies note the common practice of CEOs and boards identifying internal successors "well in
advance" of a transition, and using the intervening time to "groom" them to eventually take over as CEO. Id.
While this practice may be common, it also does not undermine the "tournament" theory-internal candidates
still compete to be crowned heir apparent. William Ocasio, InstitutionalizedAction and CorporateGovernance:

The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 384, 390 (1999).
155. Huson et al., supranote 16, at 241.
156. Id. at 242.
157.

See id. ("Managers dislike effort so they must be threatened with dismissal if performance is low.").

158.

Id.
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simply do not matter.
Coming from a different perspective, match theory starts with the idea that "there are
no good workers or good employers; there are only good matches."l59 Depending on
relative fit, a worker might be more or less productive in a given job. 160 For example, a
CEO known as a "turn-around specialist" might be well suited for a failing firm, but not
for one that is on financially firm footing.1 6 1
These theories are fascinating insights into the many puzzles succession affords, and
the disparate ways to observe them. Ultimately, however, they matter little for the focus of
this Article, which remains why for-profit firms favor internal candidates. If, as job-match
theory and scapegoating theory in divergent ways suggest, one manager is not inherently
better than the other, the question remains: why favor internal candidates?
The data on performance of external leaders relative to internal ones are inconclusive.
All that seems clear is that internal candidates dominate the field, at least in for-profit
corporations. Having eliminated the performance explanation, three competing theories
explain why firms would favor current employees over external ones: (1) the internal
candidates possess firm-specific capital; (2) the board faces fewer informational
asymmetries when evaluating internal candidates; and (3) that handicapping external
candidates fosters a firm-wide tournament that ensures hard work and competition in the
lower ranks. Each theory could adequately explain the internal premium/external
discount. 162 An unexplored area exists for testing one of these theories: the case of
leadership in higher education.
IV.

THE LACK OF A TOURNAMENT IN ACADEMIA

Academia offers a novel setting in which to test the question of leadership source
because it enables us to eliminate the tournament variable. Specifically, take the case of
the university president. The firm-specific capital and information asymmetry explanations
still hold true, but universities lack the tournament model of for-profit corporations. After
discussing the first two points briefly, the balance of this Part will establish the crucial
contention: the absence of a tournament for leadership in higher education.
First, firm-specific capital is an explanation equally applicable at any firm, be it
nonprofit or for-profit. Every employee develops specific knowledge about the people,
procedures, and networks of the organization in which she works. While both external and
internal candidates must learn the particular requirements of a new position, firm-specific
capital enables an insider to "hit the ground running" as compared to external competitors.
This explanation applies to university presidents just as much as to for-profit CEOs.
Second, information asymmetry works in much the same way in a university as in a
publicly traded for-profit corporation. In each case a part-time board selects the new leader,
and in each case the board has more data points about an internal candidate than an external
one. Boards have had the chance to interact with internal contenders on multiple occasions,
likely over a period of years. They have access to others who have worked with the
159.
160.
161.
162.
external

Sam Allgood & Kathleen A. Farrell, The Match between CEO and Firm, 76 J. Bus. 317, 318 (2003).
Id. at 320.
Id.
See Furtado & Rozeff, supra note 17, at 152 (describing these three theories as distinct disadvantages
candidates face).
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candidates, as well, and can easily obtain first-hand reports as to others' view of them. In
contrast, the board's knowledge of an external candidate is much more circumscribed, the
product of relatively few interviews or conversations. While board members can
investigate the reputation, decision-making, and quality of outsiders, they are necessarily
limited in their "due diligence" efforts. If, as is often the case, external candidates demand
confidential consideration so as not to jeopardize their current employment position, then
the board's powers of investigation are even more limited. Thus, information asymmetry
exists at the university leadership level.
Tournaments are a different story. The remainder of this Part will argue what every
single academic with whom the author has raised the question has agreed to on the spot:
there is no leadership tournament in academia. No tournament exists because one does not
become an academic in order to become a university president, but instead to become a
scholar.
Faculty members arrive at universities focused on achieving tenure status. The
promotion process emphasizes teaching, scholarship, and service responsibilities,163 rather
than on leadership interest or potential. There is hard work and competition, to be sureindeed, one could characterize striving for tenure as a tournament in its own right. Certainly
the quest for tenure shares some features of the classic Lazear and Rosen model-namely
a competition in which relative ability is hard to discern directly. 164
After triumphing in the tenure tournament, however, academics enjoy a rarefied
existence: once tenured, they have jobs that provide prestige, security, and autonomy.
Tenure can generally only be revoked in egregious circumstances, and revocation is a long
and procedurally complex process. Academics work independently, outside of a fixed
schedule. 165 Many became professors because they sought a life of "autonomy and
independence." 1 6 The life of an academic administrator is quite different. Academic
leadership, like for-profit leadership, entails subjecting oneself to "public scrutiny, critique,
comment, and review."167 Indeed, the academic who moves into an administrative role is
sometimes referred to as having "gone over to the dark side.',168 It is no wonder, then, that
"few newly minted Ph.D.s set academic administration as a career aspiration."169
Often even faculty members who serve as department head do so out of a sense of
obligation, rather than affirmative choice,170 and often "[return] (relieved and often

163.
164.

Strathe & Wilson, supranote 31, at 7.
See Lazear & Rosen, supra note 24; Richard B. McKenzie, In Defense of Academic Tenure, 152 J.

INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 325, 337 (1996) ("[P]rofessors' relative abilities are difficult to observe

directly ....

).

165. Strathe & Wilson, supranote 31.
166. Walter H. Gmelch, The Department Chair's Balancing Acts, in THE LIFE CYCLE OF A DEPARTMENT
CHAIR: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 69, 70 (Walter H. Gmelch & John H. Schuh eds., 2004).

167.

Id.

168.

Robert F. Bruner, The 3 Qualities that Make a Good Dean, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 15, 2017),

http://www.chronicle.com/aticle/The-3-Qualities-That-Make-a/238883;

see also Becker, supra note 32

(describing her time as an administrator as being on the "dark side"); Deborah DeZure et al., Cultivating the Next
Generation ofAcademic Leaders, 46 CHANGE 6, 10 (2014) ("All but one [participant in the study] indicated that

.

the phrase is widely used by their faculty colleagues . .
169. Strathe & Wilson, supra note 31, at 5.
170.

See id. ("[F]aculty members frequently did not choose to enter academic administration; rather, it was
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disillusioned) to their tenured professorial role." 17 1 Academic administration replaces
many of the benefits of the academic life with more mundane bureaucratic burdens:
While academic administrators may have some independent tasks, those
responsibilities reflect a shared mission or vision for the unit. There is limited
individual work time, with much of the work being collaborative, consensual,
and cooperative rather than independent. The academic administrator has
personnel and fiscal responsibilities that differ from those of a faculty member,
and time is much more scheduled, often by others. The time commitment to being
present in the work environment is much greater . . . Uninterrupted time is rare,

and the amount of time an administrator can commit to any single issue is often
very limited. 172

If a person's "fundamental calling" is that of researcher, scholar, and teacher, then the
"all-consuming" demands of administrative life will simply not be attractive. 173 While
compensating benefits include higher pay, more travel, and increased support,1 74
"increasing numbers are unwilling to take their turn, and too few are eager to volunteer for
administrative roles." 1 75 Apparently "the power, prestige and increased income that often
accompany managerial roles are not worth the trade-offs." 176 Deans, in particular, face
pressure from central university officials to serve university-wide goals, while
simultaneously representing the interests of their own faculty, "resulting in administrators
'swiveling between their faculty colleagues and university administration [sic]' as they try
to balance these roles." 177 In short, "college professors on average are not likely to seek a
job outside of the academia or to be willing and able to switch to performing administrative
functions." 17 8 Researchers emphasizing the importance of succession planning within
universities acknowledge "a significant challenge within academia is . . . faculty members'
lack of interest in moving into administrative positions." 1 79
One study of a "large public land-grant research university" involved interviewing
university administrators and faculty interested in leadership.' 80 It found that faculty resist

their turn . . .").
171. Sherry L. Hoppe, Identifying and Nurturing Potential Academic Leaders, in IDENTIFYING AND
PREPARING ACADEMIC LEADERS: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 3,3 (Sherry L. Hoppe & Bruce W.

Speck eds., 2003).
172. Strathe & Wilson, supra note 31, at 10.
173. James B. Carroll & Mimi Wolverton, Who Becomes a Chair?, in THE LIFE CYCLE OF A DEPARTMENT
CHAIR: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 3, 8 (Walter H. Gmelch & John H. Schuh eds., 2004).

174.
175.

Strathe & Wilson, supra note 31, at 10.
Hoppe, supranote 171.

176. Id. (quoting Thomas H. Davenport, Knowledge Work and the Future of Management, in THE FUTURE
OF LEADERSHIP: TODAY'S TOP LEADERSHIP THINKERS SPEAK TO TOMORROW'S LEADERS 41, 57 (Warren Bennis

et al. eds., 2001)).
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Margaret H. DeFleur et al., The Masters: Creating a New Generation of Leaders for Mass

Communication Education and Beyond, 59 COMM. EDUC. 19, 21 (2010) (quoting Walter H. Gmelch, Leadership
Succession: How New Deans Take Chargeand Learn the Job, 7 J. LEADERSHIP & ORG. STUD. 69 (2000)).
178. Olga V. Sorokina, Executive Compensation: The Case ofLiberal Arts College Presidents, 12 ISSUES IN
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179. Klein & Salk, supra note 71, at 337.
180.
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a move into administration because "it takes faculty from the things they most love about
academic life: research, teaching, and students." 1 81 Concerns about "demands on time, loss
of control of time, and the 'grinding amount of work' were also expressed.182 With new
administrative duties came the "awkward and difficult" task of supervising and evaluating
their erstwhile peers. 183 Coupled with these was the perception that their work as
administrators would not be appreciated.184 This lack of interest in administration on the
part of the university rank and file means that the bulk of tenured faculty are not interested
in the lower level administrative jobs that would enter them in the ranks of academic
leadership. Lack of interest in these positions means that relatively few qualified candidates
progress from department head to associate dean, dean, vice president, and provost, thus
positioning them to compete for the ultimate goal of the top institutional position,
university president.
Another related aspect of academic leadership distinguishes it from the CEO
tournament: it does not presume or encourage ascending the leadership chain. Most
universities do not have robust systems for hiring, training, and promoting leaders, or for
succession planning.185 Academic success often requires specialization, but academic
leaders, like all leaders, must be generalists.186 Academia can be downright "suspicious"
of faculty who evince an interest in administration.187 Their fellow faculty members will
presume academic leaders have "given up on their intellectual aspirations." 88
Far from being a tournament, the data show that, even after ascending the hierarchy
to be the university's chief academic officer (CAO)-often termed the provost-frequently
does not naturally feed into the presidency at that particular school, much less any other.
While a CAO role is the most common launching pad for a presidency, only 34% of
presidents were CAOs immediately prior to taking their positions.189 Just one-fifth of chief
academic officers ascend to a presidency. 190 A survey found that "two-thirds of CAOs
consider the work of the president unappealing, and many consider it too time consuming

181. Id.
182. Id. at 8.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 10.
185. See Gmelch, supra note 166, at 71 (noting that "most institutions of higher education have inadequate
hiring, training, promotional, and succession planning systems"); Klein & Salk, supra note 71, at 336 (calling
presidential succession planning "nonexistent").
186. See Gmelch, supra note 166, at 70 ("We promulgate the same in higher education, socializing and
rewarding new Ph.D.s to become internationally renowned experts in narrow fields and then complain that no
one is willing or prepared to be a generalist and serve in a leadership capacity.").
187. Dennis M. Barden & Janel Curry, Faculty Members Can Lead, but Will They?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Faculty-Members-Can-Lead-but/1 38343/.
188. Id.
189. Leading DemographicPortraitof CollegePresidents Reveals Ongoing Challengesin Diversity, Aging,
AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Pages/ACPS-Release-2012.aspx;
see also Wei Song & Harold V. Hartley III, A Study of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities,
COUNCIL OF INDEP. CS., (2012), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED533603.pdf (noting that fewer than 24% of
surveyed CAOs planned to seek a presidency, and 29% entered their presidencies from the CAO position.).
190. Rita Bornstein, Succession Planning: The Time Has Come, TRUSTEESHIP MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2010, at
28, 30.
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and too visible." 1 91
Having identified the dearth of external CEOs, three possible explanations, and the
lack of a tournament in the academic section, the next section moves to the data. I begin
with a description of the process of selecting a university president.
A. Selection Process: President
The job of university president is a challenging one. Cohen and Marsh describe it as
"part arbitrator, part bureaucrat, part manager, part administrator, part fund-raiser, part
coach, part faculty scourge, part politician." 1 92 As we have seen above, for-profit boards
generally have a succession plan in place. Selection of the next CEO is thus a matter of
promoting the heir apparent to the leadership role. The selection of a university president
is a different process entirely.
Traditionally the process for hiring a university president begins with the current
president announcing plans for departure. If the departure is abrupt, the board will generally
select an interim president. Traditionally, the next step is an open national search. 9 3
Boards will often appoint a search committee. 194 The search committee will attempt to
recruit the best possible candidates to its search pool. To aid in this effort, the search
committee will "almost universally" hire a search firm. 195
After an open nomination process, the search firm will cull from the nominees to come
up with a "short list" of candidates, usually about twelve to fifteen. 196 After reference
checks and other "due diligence,"197 a subset of these candidates will conduct "airport
interviews," so named because, for confidentiality and convenience reasons, they are
generally conducted at a hotel close to an airport. 198 Following these relatively brief
interviews, the search committee will narrow the field to three to four finalists who will
visit campus for a full day or more of interviews, meetings, campus tours, and often some
type of open campus forum.199 The search committee then invites and receives feedback
from the university community on each of the finalists. It prepares a final report with
191.

Id. Another study specifically found that women CAOs do not seek to be presidents, for "three major

reasons": "the belief that the presidency would distance them from 'the academic heart' of the institution, they do
not want to engage in the fund raising and socializing required of a president, and they want more balance in their

lives than the all-consuming presidential schedule allows." Id. (citing a study by Diane Dean).
192.

TICHY, supra note 73, at 275.
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Klein & Salk, supra note 71, at 338.

194. Sometimes collective bargaining agreements determine the selection of the search chair or committee
members; other times "tradition and community expectations" shape these choices. Jamie Ferrare & Theodore
Marchese, Increasing the Odds for Successfl PresidentialSearches, TRUSTEESHIP MAG. (Sept./Oct. 2010),
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David Williamson, Whiffing the Airport Interview, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 27, 2008),

http://www.chronicle.com/article/Whiffing-the-Airport-Interview/45824. Because candidates are often sitting
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post, confidentiality is a key concern.
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recommendations, and then meets with the board to discuss their findings. The board then
decides on a candidate and a subset of the board will negotiate a contract and prepare the
public announcement. 20 0
Note, too, that public university presidents, in particular, may be different from private
university presidents. A number of studies either explicitly or implicitly presume as much.
Specifically, most of the university president compensation studies focus on private, rather
than public institutions.201 As Brian Galle and David Walker observe, in private
universities the "chain of command" ends with the board of trustees, which is "selfreplicating and/or include members elected by alumni." 202 In contrast, public university
trustees are chosen by political actors, such as state governors.203 What is more, many
public state universities are organized into a state system, with the system head serving as
the senior-most executive.204 Galle and Walker conclude that the president of a public
university is a fundamentally different animal from that of a private university: "At bottom,
a public university president is a government official, not an autonomous head of an
independent institution."205 The data analysis section, mindful of this distinction, will
explore any differences in leadership choices at public versus private institutions.
B. Literature
Prior literature on academic leadership, much like legal scholarship, has centered on
compensation. One study found that the presidents of a group of 387 selective private
colleges and universities saw compensation increase by 50% in real terms between 1997
and 2007.206
Ronald G. Ehrenberg et al. conducted the first major study of presidential pay in 2001,
looking at the Form 990s that over 400 private colleges and universities filed with the IRS,
and found that "[t]he typical president in [their] sample began his or her presidency at age
48 and had been in the position for over eight years.... About 18% of the presidents were
women, but the percentage of women presidents at research and doctoral institutions was
only 8%."207 They found only weak evidence to support the hypothesis that university
president compensation is related to their institutions' performance.208 Wei Song and
Harold Hartley conducted a study of general characteristics of university presidents, based
on the American Council on Education's American College President Study, a survey of
200.

Id.

201.

See, e.g., Ronald G. Ehrenberg et al., Paying Our Presidents: What Do Trustees Value?, 25 REV.

HIGHER EDUC. 15 (2001); Ying Sophie Huang & Carl R. Chen, Are College ChiefExecutives PaidLike Corporate
CEOs or Bureaucrats?,45 APPLIED EcON. 3035 (2013); Sorokina, supra note 178. Galle and Walker justify this
focus because, in part, compensation of a public university president may be capped under as a matter of state

law, or in practice "may be limited by the realities of state budgeting processes." Brian Galle & David 1. Walker,
Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Problem: Evidencefrom US. Colleges and Universities, 94 B.U. L. REV.
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more than 1,600 college and university presidents nationwide. 209 They found in 2006 that
the mean age of college presidents in the data set was about 57 years, with 23% being
women.210 Their average job tenure was 7.7 years.211 One-third were promoted from
within the same institution, two-thirds came from different institutions. 212
V. THE

DATA

This Article's dataset is universities ranked in the top 50 by U.S. News & World
Report for at least seven years from the period from 1995-2016. An initial challenge was
identifying university presidents 2 13 and categorizing them as external or internal. There is
no central repository listing academic leadership, but most school websites identify their
previous presidents. For those schools that did not list prior presidents on their website, I
identified the current president and performed a series of internet searches to determine the
progression for such schools. I then used the school's website or other related sources, such
as press releases, faculty biographies, newspaper articles, or-in some cases-obituaries,
to identify and document each president's name, the year and month that he or she began
serving as president, whether the president was hired internally or externally, and the date
month of the president's leaving office. Note that leaders hired from- an outside institution
are classified as external and those hired from within the school are internal. While it is
true that a recent hire may in certain lights be considered "external" to the institution,
delineating the time when an external hire became "internal" seemed a subjective
undertaking. Thus, a president who was hired from within the school is marked as internal,
regardless of the brevity of that president's prior tenure at the school.
A. Descriptive Statistics
As discussed, the Article's dataset covers universities ranked in the top 50 by U.S.
News & World Report for at least seven years from 1995-2016. This amounts to only 57
different institutions, and thus 1197 (57 times 21) possible points at which a transition
could occur. In the great majority of cases, there is no change.
The sample covered 108 permanent presidents at these 57 institutions who were hired
between 1996-2016 (133 if one counts interims), of whom 22 were women (27 counting
interims), and 86 were male (106 counting interims). Women made up 20.4% of the
sample. The sample covered 51 universities, of which 18 were public and 33 were private.
Of those 33 private institutions, four were religious.

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Song & Hartley Ill, supra note 189, at ii.
Id. at 5, 6.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 25.
Since U.S. News began ranking schools, it has separated universities from colleges. In its words, "[t]he

universities offer a full range of undergraduate majors, as well as master's and doctoral degrees; many strongly
emphasize research." Robert Morse et al., Best Colleges Ranking Category Definitions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD

REP. (Sept. 11, 2017, 10:00 PM), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/ranking-categorydefinitions. They are defined by the Carnegie classification as Doctoral Universities (highest research activity),
Research Universities (higher research activity), and Doctoral Universities (moderate research activity). Id.
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B. Methodology
The first hypothesis asks the perennial question: Do internal presidents perform better
than external ones? To measure performance, I used the U.S. News and World Report
Ranking. The benefit of this approach is that U.S. News evaluates a number of factors,
including strength of entering class, student: faculty ratio, and post-graduate employment.
Moreover, U.S. News applies its formula consistently to each ranked institution each year.
In other words, while its methodology may change from year to year, it applies any changes
uniformly to every institution.
The drawback of this approach is the U.S. News ranking system is widely criticized
as being fundamentally flawed.214 By selecting this measure of success, I offer no defense
or endorsement of the U.S. News rankings themselves. But their dominance means that,
increasinly and for better or worse, they are a popular measure of academic leadership
success.
1. Hypothesis One
One challenge the data present is that because U.S. News did not initially rank below
the top 50 universities, early in the sample period there are some "non-ranked" (NR)
values. In calculating performance, I assume these NR-institutes would be ranked below
the lowest-ranked-institute. Suppose that I observe the lower sorted ranks within a year as:
49, 50, NR, NR, NR, so that there are three NR-institutions. In this case, I assume that the
3 missing institutions would have received the ranks 51, 52, and 53, but since I have no
information on which of the 3 is better than the others, each of the three 'NR' will be
imputed as the average, 52.
A second challenge is that in many years the U.S. News ranks two or more institutions
as tied. (e.g., 1, 2, 2, 4, 5, 6). Since the two schools which US news considered 'tied for
second' really share the second and third spot, our corrected ranks for these 6 would be: 1,
2.5, 2.5, 4, 5, 6.
Third, the U.S. News ranking masks a key problem: not all changes in ranking are
equal. A ranking drop from number I to number 2, for example, is far more substantial
than a drop from 32 to 33. I use a Blum transformation to weight U.S. News rankings to
reflect this reality. 2 16

214. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, The Order of Things: What College Rankings Really Tell Us, THE NEW
YORKER (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/02/14/the-order-of-things ("[T]he U.S.
News algorithm relies. . . on proxies for quality-and the proxies for educational quality turn out to be flimsy at
best."); John Tierney, Your Annual Reminder to Ignore the U.S. News & World Report College Rankings, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/09/your-annual-reminder-toignore-the-em-us-news-world-report-em-college-rankings/279103/ ("Using the US. News rankings for any more
exacting purpose [than a rough guide to American higher education] is about as good for you as eating potato
chips and Gummy Bears for dinner. With maple syrup.").
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Record,
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2013),

https://www.usnews.com/info/blogs/press-room/2013/09/12/us-news-breaks-online-traffic-record.
216. A Blum transformation is a simple generalization to replace ranks by Z-scores in some way such that
the ranks are replaced by expected Z-scores of items ranked 1, 2, . . ., n from a normally distributed population.

We use an n=100 in this case, since we believe that the rankings covered the top half of Law Schools or
Universities. Then we use the Blum approximation Phi(Z) = (n-r+0.625)/(n+0.25), for rank r-{ 1, 2, ... n) to
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Finally, a key challenge on measuring the impact of new presidential leadership is the
fact that the president inherits an institution shaped by her predecessor. In order to measure
the impact of leadership change, analysis must discount the early years of a president's
tenure.
The most common status, coded as '0' in the data-set, was no change-the current
leader was the same as in the previous academic year. Status '1' indicates that an interim
leader had been selected, and this status of '1' would continue until either the interim leader
became a permanent leader or was replaced by another permanent leader. The status '2'
represents the first year of a permanent internal-to-the-institution leader, while status '3'
represents the first year of a permanent external-to-the-institution leader.
For example, one pattern of interest would be (0, 3, 0, 0, 0), representing the situation
where there is a permanent President in Year 0, followed by an External President in Year
1, with him/her remaining in the position for the next 3 years, i.e., Year 2, Year 3, and Year
4. The weighted Z-score change scheme is shown below.
Table 1: University Leadership Change Pattern:From Permanent to External
President
Year

Year 0

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Pattern

0

3

0-

0

0

Rank

Rank 0

Rank I

Rank 2

Rank 3

Rank4

Z-score

ZO

ZI

Z2

Z3

Z4

Year 0 is the year prior to a new president's ascension to the presidency, and it sets
the baseline. I weight the first year of the presidency 10%, the second year 20%, the third
year 30%, and the fourth year at 40%. Generally, the four year weighted Z-score change
for Universities is calculated as: UnivChange = (0.1 * ZI + 0.2 * Z2 + 0.3 * Z3 + 0.4 * Z4)
- zo.
Below, I report the seven most interesting patterns, as well as their frequency, mean,
and standard deviation. In the coding below, Blue represents the weighted four-year Zscore change when there is no leadership change, Green represents the weighted four-year
Z-score change when an Internal President follows either a permanent or interim President,
and Red represents the weighted four-year Z-score change when an external President
follows either a permanent or interim President.

estimate the Z's before calculating differences, where Phi0 represents the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal. For example, if one uses n=1 00, the difference in Z-scores for the 1st and 2nd ranked schools
would be 0.361, whereas it would be only .025 for the difference between the 50th and 51st schools.
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Table 2: University Leadership and Performance
n

Mean

Standard Deviation

483

0.005

0.124

New internal

9

-0.019

0.095

Internal following
interim

8

0.018

0.105

New external
External following
interim

28

0.056

0.205

27

0.022

0.087

No leadership
change

The average weighted four-year Z-score change when there was no Presidential
change was very close to zero (+0.005), and no group's mean change is significantly
different from zero. In other words, there is no statistically significant difference between
the performance of internal or external candidates. Total changes are only 72 because the
analysis requires four consecutive years of service, preceded by a baseline year, and some
instances did not fit-for example, a president did not complete four years or began his
term in 2015, at the tail end of the sample period.
2. Hypothesis Two
The literature poses three dominant explanations for favoring internal candidates:
firm-specific capital, information asymmetry, and tournament theory. Academia, because
of the lack of a tournament, offers the ability to test the relative explanatory power of
tournament theory vis-a-vis the other two explanations. If the chief reason for favoring
internal candidates is firm-specific capital or information asymmetry, then university
trustees will favor internal candidates. The percentage of external CEOs in for-profit
corporations centers around 22%. The hypothesis is that, because of the lack of a
tournament, external candidates will make up more than 22% of university presidents.
There are several different change patterns in the data set. Ultimately, I created a
collapsed version of this variable, called Ultimate Change Type, with levels of Ultimate
External (Categories I and 3) and Ultimate Internal (Categories 2, 4, and 5).
Table 3: Change Categorization

62

21

3=nterim/
External

4=Interim/
Self

5=lnterim/
Internal

20

3

2

108

There are 133 leadership changes in the sample, and 108 permanent changes. In some
cases, an external candidate is selected to begin a term as soon as the current president
steps down-classified as a Category 1 change, which occurred 62 times. A Category 2
change is when an internal candidate similarly immediately succeeds the past president
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(21). When the university interposes an interim candidate before finalizing a successor,
Categories 3 (external, 20) and 5 (internal, 2) apply. Category 4 describes when the interim
president is ultimately selected as the permanent president, which occurred 3 times.
Concatenating the five levels above into two, internal presidents constituted 26
presidents during the period, and external presidents constituted 82. External candidates
comprise 76% of successful university presidents, and internal presidents 24%. Thus, while
for-profit corporations exhibit a bias in favor of internal candidates, top universities exhibit
an almost mirror-image bias in favor of external candidates, offering support of the
tournament theory in public for profit corporations. The results suggest that tournament
theory explains at least part of the bias in favor of internal CEOs.
The literature has discussed this preference for external candidates for the position of
university president, but has often conflated process (an outside search) with outcome
(selecting an external candidate as president). For example, Lapovsky, as described by
Klein and Salk, offers five explanations for why academia favors "outside searches": "(a)
multiple stakeholders with dissimilar objectives; (b) the need to mirror faculty search
processes; (c) perception that internal candidates may not be able, or hesitant, to make
necessary changes; (d) boards' perception of insider loyalty and inability to make personnel
decisions; and (e) prestige awarded to the institution for bringing in someone from the
outside." 2 17
But, the very term "outside search" makes an assumption. A national search does not
preordain an outside university president. What separates university president selection
from CEO succession planning is the very fact of a formal, openly acknowledged search.
Indeed, succession planning is a rare occurrence in academia. Klein and Salk, interviewing
presidents, board chairs, and search firms that work with 20 private higher education
institutions in Wisconsin, found that succession planning "goes against the beliefs and
traditions of the academy."218 Because of a culture of collaboration and shared governance,
no successor can be preselected.2 19
Again, an outside search is not synonymous with an internal hire-internal candidates
can, and do, participate in a national search process, and sometimes are selected as
president. Indeed, Klein and Salk found in their sample a willingness to consider internal
candidates, as long as they competed with external candidates in a national search.220 In an
interesting rejection of the information asymmetry argument, they noted that internal
candidates might be handicapped in the process precisely because they are better known
than external candidates: "internal candidates' weaknesses are already known ... they have
221
baggage, and because of this, oftentimes the bar is set higher for that candidate."
Familiarity may not exactly breed contempt, but it "works against internal candidates, who
222
might be too well known by their peers to be viewed as charismatic or visionary."
External candidates are seen as having new energy and charisma. They are perceived to be

217.

Klein & Salk, supra note 71, at 338; see also Bornstein, supra note 190, at 29 (describing a "long-held

bias against hiring from within").

218.
219.
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Klein & Salk, supra note 71, at 339.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Bornstein, supra note 190, at 31.
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"wonderful" even before anything is known about them.223 One board chair stated, "I could
see the sparkly eyed reactions to some of the external candidates." 224
Tellingly, one major reason Klein & Salk cite is faculty's lack of interest in
administration-coupled, most notably, with a lack of interest on the part of chief academic
officers-i.e., provosts-in the presidency.225 This reason only buttresses this Article's
contention that academic leadership does not follow the tournament model.
3. Hypothesis Three
However, the governance structure of a public university introduces two additional
layers of complexity. The first problem is a political one. As discussed above in Part IV,
public university trustees are chosen by political actors, such as state govemors.226 Thus,
their choices for university president may be influenced by political motives wholly apart
from selecting the optimal candidate for president. If the university presidency is part of a
larger political bargain, I would predict that more internal presidents in these university
system schools. External candidates, likely coming from out of state, would have relatively
less in-state political capital than outsiders.
Table 4 presents the ultimate external and internal candidates, disaggregating public
and private institutions.
Table 4: Private vs. Public Institutions
Private
46
14
60

Ultimate Extemal
Ultimate Internal
Total

Public
36
12
48

Total
82
26
108

The Pearson X2 = 0.0405, which, with df= 1, yields a P-value of 0.8405, which is not
significant at all, indicating that I cannot conclude that the ultimate change type (external
or internal) and the University type (private or public) are dependent. That is, the ultimateexternal-change and ultimate-intemal-change universities are about equally likely (56%
and 54%, respectively) to be private.
4. Hypothesis Four
A subset of the public university sample presents a second problem. Of the eighteen
public universities in the sample, fourteen are part of a state "system" of universities

223.

Klein & Salk, supra note 71, at 341.

224. Id.; see also Bornstein, supra note 190, at 30 ("Internal candidates have the advantages of being well
known and of understanding the culture of the institution. However, qualified internal candidates often are
overlooked because institutions seek to appoint presidential candidates from other institutions to provide 'a fresh
vision."').

225. Klein & Salk, supranote 71, at 343 ("[L]ess than one third of chief academic officers are even interested
in the role of president.").
226.

See supra Part IV.A.
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overseen by a single governing body.227 This governing body selects the president of each
university within the state. Thus, for example, the Board of Regents of the University of
California oversees nine institutions within the University of California System ("UC
System"). The President of the UC System selects a proposed candidate, which she submits
to the Board of Regents for approval. Similarly, the Board of Regents oversees twentyeight institutions within the University System of Georgia. However, the Board of Regents
of the University System of Georgia directly selects a university president, rather than
having the Chancellor offer one for Board of Regents approval.
Whether by way of direct selection or by affirming the prior selection of the system
head, however, the Board of Regents stands once removed from a single-college Board of
Trustees. Their attention will be less focused, and there will be more information
asymmetry. The firm-specific capital theory will still hold true, however: internal
candidates will still have university-specific information, connections, and network that
should give them the edge over external candidates. So if information asymmetry (as
opposed to firm-specific capital) explains the favoring of internal candidates, then there
will be fewer internals at system schools (because they are less well known by the Board
of Regents).
Table 5: Sole vs. System Universities

Ultimate External
Ultimate Internal
Total

Sole
54
16
70

S stem
28
10
38

Total
82
26
108

The Chi-square test for this table produces a test statistic X2= 0.0275 with df = 1, and
the associated P-value is 0.8683. Again, I cannot reject the null hypothesis. The data
indicates that I cannot conclude that the ultimate change type (external or internal) and the
board type (sole or system) are dependent, even though ultimate-external-change
universities are slightly more likely to be sole board types (66%) than are ultimate-internalchange universities (62%).
Religiously affiliated schools have a unique mission, one centered around a particular
faith. This limited mission will necessarily limit the pool of available candidates to head
these organizations. There are only four such organizations in the sample: Boston College

227. The state system schools in the sample include the UC schools Berkeley, Irvine, San Diego, California
Institute of Technology, Davis, Santa Barbara, and UCLA (University of California System, consisting of a total
of nine universities), the University of Florida (State University System of Florida, twelve universities), Georgia
Institute of Technology (University System of Georgia, twenty-eight universities), the University of Illinois
(University of Illinois System, consisting of three universities), the University of North Carolina (the University
of North Carolina System, seventeen universities), Pennsylvania State University (Pennsylvania's State System
of Higher Education, fourteen universities), the University of Texas (University of Texas System, eight academic
institutions), and the University of Wisconsin (University of Wisconsin System, thirteen universities). Four public
universities have separate boards governing themselves alone: the University of Michigan (Board of Regents),
the University of Virginia (Board of Visitors), College of William & Mary (Board of Visitors), and the University
of Washington (Board of Regents).
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(Catholic), Georgetown University (Catholic), Notre Dame (Catholic), and Yeshiva
University (Jewish). I might thus predict that they will have fewer external candidates as
compared to the larger sample, because they cannot partake as easily of any market for
external presidential candidates. However, the sample size here is so small (only four
universities) that it precludes meaningful analysis.
Sorokina finds a pay premium associated with women liberal arts college presidents,
noting that they made an average of 8% more than male presidents. She speculates that
high demand for female presidential candidates might explain the premium, especially
given that "there is a growing need to attract women to faculty and administrative
positions" despite the fact that women are "still underrepresented among Ph.D. recipients
and college administrators." 22 8
5. Hypothesis Five
Sorokina's finding suggests the need to examine the sample through a different lens.
Women make up only 20.3% of the total sample. They are clearly highly desirable
candidates, and their inclusion in the data may well bias the results towards external hires.
That is, the pressure on an institution to find a woman might swamp ordinary concerns
about lack of firm-specific capital. Hypothesis five thus posits that demand for women
candidates may inflate the external market. If so, if tournament theory has explanatory
power, then there will be significant numbers of external candidates even when considering
just the male presidents.
Table 6: Gender

Ultimate External
Ultimate Internal
Total

Female
18
4
22

Male
64
22
86

Total
82
26
108

Next, I conducted a Pearson Chi-square test of independence of rows and columns on
the data shown in Table 5. This yields an X2 = 0.1980 with df = 1, and P-value = 0.6563,
so I cannot reject the null hypothesis in this case. Thus, I do not have enough evidence to
reject the null hypothesis. That is, even though ultimate-external changes are more likely
to be to females (22/o-15%) than are ultimate-internal changes, this difference is not
statistically significant.
C. Apples and Oranges: The GeneralizabilityQuestion
The strength of the study is also its weakness: the academic market removes the
tournament variable, allowing us to test it. But, if the academic leadership market is
fundamentally different from the for-profit market, then any lessons are of limited utility.
There are two answers to this objection. First, the varied settings in which leadership
studies have been conducted comparing across a variety of industries, geographical
228.

Sorokina, supra note 178, at 9.
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regions, and even into leadership in the context of sports teams and religious institutions.
These many studies from disparate disciplines suggest that there is some value in cross
industry comparisons. Second, CEO and president selection is actually more similar than
many of these settings (e.g., managers of sports teams or CEOs of private firms), because
both models feature not a single decisionmaker selecting amongst candidates, but rather a
board composed of individuals from outside the organization. University governance bears
a striking similarity to the governance of publicly traded U.S. corporations: both are
governed by part-time boards composed largely of outsiders to the organization.
As discussed in Part Ill, independent directors constitute the majority of publicly
traded boards. As with their for-profit counterparts when selecting a CEO, so for boards of
trustees, choosing a president is the most important job.229 The governing board of a
university (known variously as a board of trustees, board of regents, or board of visitors)
is composed largely of volunteers from outside the university that donate their time to its
governance. Typically they consist of rich, powerful, and well-connected alums or,
especially in the public context, politically important individuals.
Boards tend to be weak because they work part-time, and spend only "a small fraction
of their time" in overseeing the university, as opposed to a full-time employee (or
prospective employee), who has a clear and deeply personal interest in the question of his
compensation. o Moreover, these trustees have no immediate economic interest in the
transaction-they are, in fact, spending other people's money.231 Finally, Galle and Walker
posit that nonprofit trustees likely have relational ties to presidents that "encourage a
culture of deference" to the executive.232 Thus, the university setting is in this sense
remarkably similar to public corporate governance, and may prove a fairer comparison than
many others.
Still, a third objection to extrapolating from the university to the for-profit setting
exists. Some studies test the hypothesis that external candidates fare better when they come
from firms in the same industry. The theory is that, while firm-specific capital might not
matter, industry-specific capital does.
If this theory holds, it presents another challenge because it suggests that academic
leadership, as a homogeneous industry, may be more conducive to external candidates than
for-profit firms in general. In other words, running one university is much the same as
running another.
To take one recent example of the perils of cross-industry CEO hires, in 2011 discount
retailer J.C Penny's hired Ron Johnson, formerly a "star retailer" of Apple, to be its next
CEO. Johnson's bold new strategy, which included ending its traditional practice of regular
discounting, failed and led to his ouster two years later. One explanation offered for
Johnson's failure was that he came from outside the industry (although he had also worked
at Target before Apple). It may be that either university governance skills are more readily
transferable and/or that the academic field is a more homogenous one that the for-profit
field. Studies in the for-profit world have shown that while external candidates are
229. Klein & Salk, supra note 71, at 340; see also Ferrare & Marchese, supra note 194 (sharing that "[flew
board decisions are more important than selecting a new president or chancellor").
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Galle & Walker, supra note 201, at 1898.
Id. at 1898-99.
Id. at 1899.
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disfavored, they are more likely in industries with a high degree of homogeneity, because
executives will have more of the human capital necessary for the position. 233
A successful university president at University X may be able to readily translate that
success to University Y. If homogeneity of institution explains the dominance of external
candidates, then I would expect to find serial presidents-individuals that hop from
presidency to presidency. The literature offers some data. Ehrenberg's study of private
institutions found that only a minority of their sample (25%) of university presidents had
been president at least once before serving in their current role.234 Of the 57 cases where
they were able to identify the prior institution, almost three-quarters were at other private,
primarily four-year institutions.235 The others were at "individual public campuses or
statewide public systems."236 Sorokina speculates that college presidents enjoy more
mobility and market demand than mere tenured faculty. 237 Sorokina found that 18 liberal
arts college presidents out of 97 (18.6%) had experience as presidents at other higher
educational institutions before assuming the presidency. 2 38
As for mobility after serving as president, Ehrenberg et al. found that over a four year
period, of the 175 who left the presidency, only 13 (0.6%) went on to be presidents of other
institutions.239 Of further interest, only one of the 13 became president of a public college
or university.2 4 0

As for our sample, if highly successful candidates are able to transfer their skills
easily, then I would expect to find a high number of candidates with serial presidencies. In
the sample of 108, I find four: Gordon Gee was president at Brown and then Vanderbilt.
Robert Bergdahl was president at Texas and then Berkeley. Charles Young was president
at UCLA and then Florida, and Lee Bollinger moved from the Michigan presidency to that
of Columbia. It may be fair to add to this set, however, the number of interim presidents
that go on to become presidents at different institutions. There are three of these, James
Wagner (interim at Case Western, then president at Emory); Phyllis Wise (Washington
interim, president of Illinois), and Carol Folt (Dartmouth interim, president of UNC). It
may be that these individuals used their interim year to learn the main skills the job of
president requires, and then were able to transfer them to a permanent position. Totaling
both figures, 6.5% of the sample presidents have moved from presidency to presidency.
Note finally that one limitation of these data is that they are limited to the 57
institutions which were ranked in the top 50 by U.S News & World Report for at least 7 of
the 22 years (1995-2016) examined. It may well be that serving as president of one these
institutions tend to represent the pinnacle of one's career, and thus there is relatively little
movement amongst positions at this level. Presidents may well move up the "ladder" of
233.

Parrino, supra note 110, at 167.
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position within the academic sector, to become presidents at more prestigious universities, to move to the business
sector or to go into teaching. Faculty, on the other hand, especially tenured professors, are more limited in their
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institutional hierarchy at a greater rate below the top 50 mark. For example, Gordon Gee
served as president of West Virginia University, University of Colorado, Ohio State
University, Brown University, Vanderbilt, Ohio State University (again), and West
Virginia University (again). President Gee, one of the repeat presidents in the sample,
appears to be an outlier in several respects: not only because of the number of institutions
he has headed, but also because after his departure from the sample universities he
continued to serve as president for several lower ranked institutions.
Other data that might cast light on the question of transferability include the number
of interim presidents that become permanent president of the same institution, or that
served as permanent president and then returned to serve as interim president. Each case
could suggest the presence of firm-specific capital.
The case of former presidents that return as interims make the clearest case for firmspecific capital. They have done this particular job at this particular institution, and the
board selects them on a temporary basis on the strength of their past knowledge. This
happens in two cases (1.9% of the sample).
The selection of an interim president as permanent president could suggest that the
candidate (who I code as internal in the first year of permanent presidency) has developed
valuable firm-specific capital while on the job. This happens on four occasions in the
sample period. However, it might also suggest that the candidates have proven themselves
to the board that picks them, which supports an information asymmetry theory. The interim
position serves as a one-year trial period in which the board gets to know the candidate
better. Interims become permanents four times in the sample period, representing 3.7% of
the presidents.
Overall, the sample is therefore something of a wash with respect to the transferability
question. On the one hand, seven presidents moved from an interim or permanent position
to another presidency, suggesting a certain transferability of managerial capital. On the
other hand, six individuals moved from interim to presidency, or vice versa, at the same
institution, suggesting the importance of institution-specific capital. From these results, it
is difficult to conclude much regarding the question whether university leadership is easily
transferable from one institution to another. The Ehrenberg and Sorokina studies suggest
that university president mobility might be limited, but more study is warranted on this
point.
In sum, analysis of the data reveals that most university presidents are external
candidates, despite the fact that insiders possess firm-specific capital and pose fewer
information asymmetry problems than do outside candidates. Analysis of performance,
public versus private institutions, system versus nonsystem institutions, and gender failed
to reveal any findings of significance. The dominance of external candidates in a nontournament setting suggest that tournament theory may be the chief driver for the
preference for internal CEOs in the for-profit setting.
VI. IMPLICATIONS

The findings have profound implications for two separate literatures. First, if for-profit
boards favor internal candidates for the purposes of fostering competition in the lower
ranks, then the search for a link between CEO provenance and performance is doomed to
fail. Tournament theory teaches that what matters is not the performance of a particular
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internal CEO or internal CEOs in general. It is instead the expectation of internal selection,
and attendant incentive effect created by the internal preference on the rest of the firm's
employees. In other words, even if an internal CEO assumes the helm and runs the
corporation poorly, she has already fulfilled her chief purpose-motivating the lower ranks
simply by virtue of being selected as CEO.
Tournament theory also casts light on the executive compensation question that has
been a major focus of legal scholarship. It predicts, however, that CEO candidates may be
willing to defer some of their earnings and compete for the prize of CEO. Tournament
theory thus explains "the very large observed differences between CEO salaries and those
of executives of the immediately lower level."24 1 Charles O'Reilly et al. called the
application of tournament theory to explain executive compensation "intriguing," but
observed that "no empirical tests of the tournament model of executive compensation with
natural data exist."
This Article provides that test.
Tournament theory means that corporations will generally not hire outsiders. Even if
viable external candidates exist, the internal cost to the organization in terms of morale and
motivation of lower level employees would be too high. This conclusion in turn suggests
that the external market for managerial talent does not and cannot exist in a meaningful
way. Determining pay levels by benchmarking is thus fundamentally misguided.
The tournament theory model depends upon delayed gratification, which is the
ultimate prize of being CEO. It follows that what matters is that the increase in CEO pay
is enough to lure potential successors from the temptation to rest on their laurels.
Shareholders' concem thus should not be how much their CEO is making relative to peers,
but rather to those very potential successors. In other words, vertical pay ratios matter more
than horizontal ones.
Circling back to the laws governing executive compensation, Part II deferred
discussion of Dodd-Frank's three main provisions: "say on pay" votes, "pay for
performance" and "pay ratio" disclosures. This Part will argue that recasting the regulatory
framework, in light of Part V's evidence that tournament theory informs the selection of
the majority of CEOs, both makes logical sense and provides considerable improvement
over the status quo.
Arguably the most successful of Dodd-Frank's three reforms to date has been the "say
on pay" rule. Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires companies to hold a nonbinding
vote at least once every three years on the compensation of executives disclosed in Section
402 of Regulation S-K.243 Currently, Regulation S-K specifies that the corporation disclose
the total compensation of the principal executive officer (PEO), principal financial officer
("PFO"), and "three most highly compensated executive officers other than the PEO and
PFO."244

Dodd-Frank's say-on-pay mandate changed the executive compensation
landscape.245 While it did not trigger widespread outrage over executive compensation
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levels, it did bring about a more focused dialogue between shareholders and proxy advisory
firms. These say-on-pay votes have not always been rubber-stamps. While shareholders
have typically endorsed companies' pay policies, there have been some notable exceptions:
About 1.3% of Russell 3000 companies experienced negative say on pay votes in 2011,
and 2.7 as of June 2012.246 While these numbers may be low, a failed vote may also signal
to activist hedge funds a discontented shareholder electorate and therefore a prime target
for attack. Thus, failed votes catalyze corporations' efforts to engage shareholders to
assuage their concerns.247 The New York City comptroller has initiated the Boardroom
Accountability Project that submits nonbinding proxy access shareholder proposals to
companies that failed or had low say-on-pay votes. 248
In short, the results of say-on-pay votes indicate that, at least sometimes, shareholders
do care about executive compensation. The question is what information shareholders
require in order to evaluate executive pay packages. Dodd Frank mandated two new types
of disclosure: the "pay versus performance" rules and the "pay ratio" rule. 249
The "pay versus performance" rule mandates that the SEC require disclosure
"information that shows the relationship between executive compensation actually paid
and . . . financial performance . . . , taking into account" the company's stock price

performance.250 In 2015 the SEC proposed rules that included disclosure in table form, as
well as a supplemental narrative portion to explain the tabular data.251 Opposition from
Commissioner Piwowar has stymied adoption of final rules. 252
The findings of this Article suggest that pay-versus-performance disclosure may not
be the most crucial element of executive compensation at all. While this information may
be useful to shareholders, if tournament theory is correct, then aligning executive pay with
performance is not the main point of executive compensation. The goal, instead, should be
to incentivize those at lower ranks vying for the position to continue the fight. If tournament
theory is the main driver for selecting a CEO, then CEO compensation need be only enough
to incentivize the tournament. Disclosure regarding compensation should be tailored to
issues that matter, and this Article suggests that internal pay scales matter more than
external ones.
The final Dodd-Frank executive compensation reform measure, the controversial "pay
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ratio" rule, may thus be on the right track by focusing on the internal pay equities of the
firm. Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to promulgate rules requiring companies to disclose
the CEO's total compensation, the median of "total compensation" for all company
employees (excluding the CEO), and then disclose the ratio of the two totals.253 The SEC
faced numerous hurdles in the rulemaking process, including identifying who counted as
an employee, identifying the median employee and determining that salary, determining
which issuers were subject to the rule, and outlining the time period for calculating its
workforce.254 The SEC passed the final rule on party lines, with the two Republican
commissioners issuing separate dissents. Commissioner Gallagher criticized the lack of
evidence that a reasonable investor would find the pay ratio useful, and opined that the
corresponding cost would be "astronomical"-thus failing the required cost-benefit
analysis for rulemaking.255 Commissioner Piwowar lamented the "name and shame"
motive behind the rule, calling it a "blatant attempt to limit executive compensation," rather
than a genuine attempt to provide information useful to shareholders. 256
This Article supports Commissioner Piwowar's position. Disclosure of the
CEO/median employee ratio provides no meaningful information to shareholders, and will
cost corporations considerable money to generate.257 As Commissioner Gallagher pointed
out, the Commission included in the definition of employee "all employees" in the
mandate-i.e., rather than limiting its application to full time U.S. employees, it applied it
to "all employees of all consolidated subsidiaries . . . located anywhere in the world,
whether full-time or part-time."258 The prospect of calculating this number, particularly for
a large multinational corporation, is a daunting one, indeed.
But, this Article shows that Dodd-Frank's pay-ratio rule got one thing right: the proper
place to look for relevant information with which to evaluate a CEO's compensation is
within the corporation, not outside it. What makes the most sense is for firms to disclose
the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the rank of subordinates most likely to produce the next
CEO candidate.
In practice, requirement disclosures will vary from firm to firm, and the fleshing out
of the specific contours of disclosure is beyond the reach of this Article. The easiest course
would be to require disclosure of the ratio of CEO pay to the other executive officers
already required to be named by Regulation S-K. A preliminary review of the top five
Fortune 500 companies reveal CEO pay at a ratio of 1.7 times that of the other named

253.

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act § 953(b).

254. SecuritiesRegulation-Dodd-FrankWall Street Reform and ConsumerProtectionAct-SEC Finalizes
RegulationsRequiring Companies to Disclose Pay Ratio between the CEO and Median Employee, 129 HARv. L.

REv. 1144, 1146-47 (2016).
255. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r, SEC, Dissenting Statement at an Open Meeting to Adopt the "Pay
Ratio" Rule (Aug. 5,

2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-statement-at-open-meeting-to-

adopt-the-pay-ratio-rule.html ("I see no credible evidence in the record that a reasonable investor would find the
pay ratio to be useful.").
256. Michael S. Piwowar, Comm'r, SEC, Dissenting Statement at Open Meeting on Pay Ratio Disclosure,
(Aug.

5,

2015),

https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-statement-at-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-

disclosure.htmi.
257. Unfortunately, given that Dodd-Frank itself requires this disclosure, and that the SEC has promulgated
final rules on the pay ratio disclosure, it would take congressional action or agency rescission to remove its force.

258.

Gallagher, supra note 255.

The Journalof CorporationLaw

578

[Vol. 43:3

executives. But that number contains several anomalies. At $8.7 million, Apple's CEO Tim
Cook makes less than the other five named executives, all of whom make around $22.8
million.259 Similarly, Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway's CEO, made more than four
times Vice Chairman of the Board, Charles Munger's $100,000 in compensation.260 But,
thanks to ownership of the company itself, Buffet's net worth is $78.5 billion,261 and
Munger's is $1.51 billion.262 Annual compensation is therefore likely not their chief
motivation or reward for performing for the company. UnitedHealth, another Fortune 10
company, lists as two of its named executives its chief legal officer and executive vice
president for human capital.263 Neither position is likely to produce the current CEO's
likely successor.
The more useful information for shareholders would be for boards, in the course of
the succession planning they typically do, to disclose the ratio of candidates they have
identified as potential successors. This information would be far easier to compile than that
required by the current pay-ratio rule, which entails cataloging each employee and
ascertaining his or her pay. The corporation has, or should have, a short list of internal
candidates as part of its succession planning. Given the limited set of candidates,
calculating the ratio should be easy. There will be anomalous cases, typically with a
founder CEO like Warren Buffett whose net worth far eclipses annual compensation. But
such a ratio is a logical part of the corporation's justification to shareholders of its global
executive compensation scheme.
Implicit in this suggestion is that it would require boards to disclose that they do, in
fact, have a succession plan in place-or explain why they do not have one. The next
logical question is, how much more should a CEO make as compared to potential CEOs in
waiting? Should CEOs make twice what their would-be-successors make? Is more money
needed to provide the appropriate incentive? Disclosure of the "would-be-CEO" to current
CEO pay ratio would allow informed debate about this question. Eventually norms would
emerge, and shareholders would be able to identify outlier corporations that pay their CEOs
well in excess of what appears necessary to motivate the lower ranks.
VII. CONCLUSION

Ronald Coase's central insight in the Nature of the Firm is that a manager's decision
to "make or buy" determines the boundaries of the firm.264 Among the most important
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question a firm's board of directors confronts is whether it should make or buy its CEO.
The answer, for public corporations, appears to be that they produce leaders from within.
This Article examined the question of the underlying reasons for the dominance of
internal CEOs. Evidence from the academic market suggests that a tournament model,
where insiders are promoted to CEO in order to incentivize the rest of the corporation's
employees to compete, explains the internal preference better than the competing theories
of firm-specific capital or information asymmetry. If corporations favor internal candidates
for purposes of internal motivation, then the internal preference is "sticky"-firms will
continue to favor internal candidates over external ones, and the market for external CEOs
will remain relatively slow.
The lack of a robust external market frees compensation committees from the current
pressure to look to external benchmarks when setting pay. Tournament theory suggests that
instead of looking outside the firm for cues on CEO compensation, the board should instead
look within it. The CEO's salary should be set high enough to incentivize potential
successors to exert their best effort.
Viewed in this light, current securities requirements miss the mark by requiring pay
versus performance disclosure, and the pointless disclosure of the relationship of CEO
salary to that of median employee. Requiring disclosure of the ratio between salaries of the
CEO and next-in-line allow the board to present the shareholders with a full vision of its
plan for the future of the corporation and for its broader plan for incentivizing its top talent.
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